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Session Armor:
Protection Against Session Hijacking using Per-Request Authentication
Andrew J. Sauber
Dr. Harish Sethu
Modern life increasingly relies upon web applications to provide critical services and
infrastructure. Activities of banking, shopping, socializing, entertainment, and evenmed-
ical record keeping arenowprimarily conductedusing the Internet as amedium andHTTP
as a protocol. A critical requirement of these tools is the mechanism by which they au-
thenticate users and prevent transaction replay. Despitemore than 20 years of widespread
deployment, the de-facto technique for accomplishing these goals is the use of a static ses-
sion bearer token to authenticate all requests for the lifetime of a user session. In addition,
the use of any method to prevent request replay is not in common practice. _is the-
sis presents Session Armor, a protocol which builds upon existing techniques to provide
cryptographically-strong per-request authenticationwith both time-based and optional ab-
solute replay prevention. Session Armor is designed to perform well and to be easily de-
ployed by web application developers. It acts as a layer on top of existing session tokens,
so as not to require modiûcation of application logic. In addition to Session Armor, two
additional tools are presented, JackHammer, a cross-browser extension that allows devel-
opers to quickly discover session hijacking vulnerabilities in their web applications, and
SessionJack, a tool for analyzing the security properties of session tokens found on theweb.
A formal speciûcation of the Session Armor protocol is provided. An implementation of
the protocol is included as a PythonDjangomiddleware and a Chrome browser extension.
Performance data is providedwith a comparison to previousmethods. A formal validation
of secrecy and correspondence properties is presented in the Dolev-Yao model.

11. Introduction
Fundamental activities in society are now inextricably linked to the world wide web.
In fact, formany people they are synonymouswith its use: shopping, banking, catching up
with friends and family, dating, grocery shopping, and evenmedical service now oen be-
gin online. However,HTTP, conceived as a networked document retrieval system,was not
designed to be used in some of these sensitive contexts. _e protocol developed at CERN
for simplifying dissemination of scientiûc data is now used as the means for interacting
with applications responsible for authenticating and authorizing these critical activities.
In the original HTTP standard as implemented, there was no explicit capability or expec-
tation for arbitrary data to be sent to the server by the user. [8] In fact,HTTP requests are
deûned as idempotent in this historic speciûcation.
One feature that applications using HTTP wish to provide is the notion of a user ses-
sion,whereby a user ûrst provides some credentials as ameans of authentication (usually a
username and password), and is subsequently authorized to access and/ormodify the state
of the application for some period of time (the session length), or until the user logs oò, to
explicitly terminate the session. Unfortunately, there are a number of means by which an
attacker can take control of user sessions, even when current state-of-the-art practices of
session protection are in-use.
_is thesis presents Session Armor, a protocol used to prevent session hijacking of
web applications. It provides a mechanism for per-request authentication of a protocol-
required set of data, in addition to application-speciûc data. Most importantly, it also pro-
vides for robust replay prevention using both a time-based and nonce-basedmethod. _e
nonce-basedmethod provides absolute replay prevention. Built into Session Armor is the
enforcement of a session expiry deadline and inactivity-based expiry, to prevent a session
2extension attack. A block cipher on the server-side and HMAC on both ends are used as
cryptographic primitives to achieve these goals.
1.1 Overview
In chapter 1,wepresent the current state-of-the-art inHTTP session protection, Cookie-
backed sessions and the related concept of bearer tokens. A description of techniques for
Session Hijacking,malicious control of user sessions, are also presented. _ese techniques
include Session Sidejacking, Cross-Site Scripting, Session Fixation, physical access, Cross-
Site Request Forgery, and Rouge Browser Extensions. _e Session Extension attack is also
presented ameans for amalicious party to increase the likelihood of a bearer token being
obtained.
In chapter 2, two tools are presented thatwere built to observe Session Hijacking in the
wild, SessionJack, and JackHammer. _e ûrst can be used to analyze browser-extracted
cookie data for known vulnerabilities, and record session lifetimes. _e second uses aweb-
socket server and two browser extensions to shuøe speciûed sets of unprotected cookie
data between two web browsers. _is tool can be used to instantly test for session token
extraction vulnerabilities of live web applications. Over 100 sites were tested, with a wide
range of popularity according to web rankings. It was found that over 31% le themselves
open toCross-Site Scripting, over 56% to Session Sidejacking, and 100% to bearer token ex-
traction. _e vulnerable sites includedmajor ûnancial institutions, e-commerce websites,
business services, and social media web applications. For both vulnerability and session
lifetime, there was no correlation with website popularity, indicating widespread under-
utilization of the existing protections.
In chapter 3, we present existing techniques for mitigating the risk of Session Hijack-
ing. First, ûve techniques which have been standardized in speciûcations ratiûed by the
3IETF are presented. Next, six proposed HTTP authentication protocols which have ap-
peared throughout the literature are presented. A number ofweaknesses in these protocols
are discussed, including vulnerability to Cross-Site Scripting (because of use of the use of
theURL location to store secrets), weakened implementation due to incomplete speciûca-
tion of HMAC input data, the use of block cipher modes with known attack vectors, and
undeployability due to the use of replay prevention techniques that rely on out-of-band
parameters.
In chapter 4, an overview of the SessionArmor protocol is presented including the goals
whichmotivate its design. _ese include goals of security, performance, deployability, and
ease-of-use. _e features and techniques which SessionArmor uses to distinguish itself
from prior methods are also presented in this chapter. _ese are: fully speciûed conûg-
urable input data to the HMAC, secure storage of the the HMAC key, careful choice of
cryptographic primitives, time-based replay prevention, and absolute replay prevention.
In chapter 5, a formal speciûcation of the SessionArmor protocol is presented. An exact
and detailed description of all data transferred between the client and server in each phase
of the protocol is given. A syntax is used which clearly speciûes required data, optional
data, lists of data, and functional operations of the protocol. Examples of each message
type are given in both encoded and unencoded form, and timeline diagrams are used to
clarify the operation of the protocol over the course of a user session.
In chapter 6,we describe a formal veriûcation of the protocol thatwas performed using
a proof assistant called ProVerif. _is allowed for the description of SessionArmor in an
algebraic model of computation known as process calculus. By compiling the concurrent
processes of the protocol into Boolean expressions, ProVerif was able to use established
satisûability techniques to make claims about the security properties of the protocol. Two
properties were considered, the secrecy of the HMAC key in the presence of an adver-
sary, and one-to-one correspondence of client requests and server responses, the second
4of which is equivalent to strong authentication. Both of these properties were proven by
the ProVerifmodel.
In chapter 7, a reference implementation of SessionArmor is presented, with docu-
mented source code. _e server implementation is a web application middleware, imple-
menting the entire SessionArmor speciûcationwith additional developer-oriented features
such as descriptive exceptions for all error conditions, full conûguration options, and iso-
lated debug logging. _e client implementation is a Google Chrome extension with zero-
conûguration needed from the user. Both implementations were performance-tested for
application requests and session creation time, and both performed well within the spec-
iûed goals. With analysis of the histograms presented in this chapter it can be seen that
most of client and server processing time for session creation happens in less than 370µs
andmost of client and server processing time for application requests happens in less than
1.7ms. Finally, in chapter 8 we include some concluding remarks.
1.2 Cookie-backed Sessions
As a statelessprotocol,HTTP treats each request and response as an independent trans-
action. _us, there is a fundamental challenge in associating some speciûc client, and some
permissions, with each request and response. One solution to stateless request authenti-
cation is for the client to include some data with each request that the server may be able
to use to identify and associate that request with an active application session. _e most
common method of implementing this technique is to use a bearer token embedded in an
HTTP Cookie, which is sent with each request. _is is depicted in ûg. 1.1.
Bearer tokens have been given that name because they “bear the burden” of authenti-
cating all requests for the entire duration of the session. Critical security issues associated
with this practice are the vulnerabilities that facilitate session hijacking; the ability for an
5Figure 1.1: Bearer Tokens in the form of HTTP Cookies. _e current practice for authen-
tication of web requests
attacker to perform unlimited actions and/or repeated actions on a user’s behalf if they can
obtain this token.
1.3 Motivation –_e Session Hijacking Attack
Session hijacking is a widespread vulnerability that fundamentally undermines the se-
curity of web applications. We will show that this is the case in section section 2.1 using
measurements from SessionJack. With a variety of attack vectors, it allows a malicious
party to gain control of an authenticated session, make requests on behalf of the authen-
ticated party, and perform privileged actions, oen without limitation in both scope and
6time. _e authenticated session may be that of an individual user, or an automated con-
nection used for industrial, government, or other purposes.
_is token is almost always stored as anHTTPCookie, and the data it contains is called
the Session ID. _is token is pre-authenticated by user credentials and is used by the ap-
plication to authenticate all requests until it expires. _e period of time between token
creation and expiration is the “session”. _e weakness of this approach is that this token
is static for the lifetime of the session, which is oen days or even months, and that it is
used to authenticate all requests regardless of the resource requested by the client. Session
hijacking is performed by exûltrating a bearer token from the victim’s browser, user agent,
or communication medium with the web application. If exposed by one of the following
vulnerabilities, it is always in a form that will be accepted as the session identiûer by the
server.
_e following exûltration vectors are common:
1.3.1 Session Sidejacking
_e attacker uses packet sniõng, oøine traõc decryption, or obtains requests logs
(such as those stored behind an HTTPS gateway) in order to acquire a victim’s authenti-
cated Session token. As long as the bearer token is valid, the attacker can use it to make
unlimited privileged requests. With man-in-the-middle (MITM) capabilities, the attacker
can use the bearer token to modify requests in real-time andmake unrestricted additional
requests. Techniques for obtaining MITM include: local packet sniõng via open Wi-Fi,
decrypted Wi-Fi, ARP poisoning of switched networks, and source routing at the WAN
level. Oøine traõc decryption is even possible on the latestWPA2-securedWiFi networks
if the attacker observers derivation of a Group Temporal Key (GTK), and has knowledge
of the Pre-Shared Key (PSK). [41] [31]
Onemitigation for Session Sidejacking is to useHTTPS (TLS) for every client request.
7If used for all resources during a session, the secure tunnel of TLS cannot be breached
evenwhen packet-sniõng or oøine link-layer traõc decryption is used, and thus a session
token cannot be recovered by an attacker. However, it is interesting to note that Sidejacking
is not always prevented by the use of TLS. If the session cookie does not have the secure
ag set, all that is needed is for the attacker to coerce a victim to visit any page under their
control, for example, the landing page for a cafeWiFi access point, or the contents of an
HTML email. It is trivial, e.g. for an attacker to coerce sensitive cookies to be sent over the
network by causing the user to request an <img src=> for the target domain using the
insecure scheme for an HTTP connection. _is will cause the victim’s browser to make
an insecure request destined for the target domain, including the desired session cookie: a
protocol-level downgrade attack. _e recently introducedHTTP Strict Transport Security
(HSTS) standard [26], is amitigation to this attack. However, it is not widely deployed, as
we will show using the results from Session Jack.
1.3.2 Cross-site scripting (XSS)
If an attacker can execute JavaScript code in the context of the target web application,
and the HTTPOnly ag has not been set on the Session Cookie, then the Session ID can
be stolen easily bymaking an cross-domain request containing the (programmatically ac-
cessible) Session ID to a server under the attacker’s control. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
vulnerabilities of this type are quite common [46], and are oen introduced when user-
generated content is not properly escaped as text. For example, an improperly sanitized
comment on a blog post might contain JavaScript, executed unwittingly by any user who
views the comment.
If themalicious payload size is not large enough to allow for an XMLHttpRequest or
fetch request, an imagenode can be added to theDOM,with asrc attribute craed to the
contain the Session ID, inciting the browser tomake a GET requestwith this target payload
8to the attacker’s domain. Most browsers will aggressively prefetch even those image nodes
which will not be visible to the user. Conveniently, the response from the attacker’s server
need not be valid image data as the request alone satisûes the desired outcome of divulging
the session token. Also, image requests are not subject to the same origin policy, which
makes then even easier to implement than the traditional asynchronous request, which
requires the attacker to conûgure a CORS policy for their domain.
1.3.3 Session Fixation
With Session Fixation the attacker chooses a Session ID for the victim,which the victim
subsequently authenticates while under attacker control.
_e Session ID can be set, for example, using a modiûed HTTP response from the
server if aMITM is in eòect, or in an email message containing a Session ID in the URL.
_e latter requires that the web application implements a (hopefully legacy) mode of op-
eration in which the Session ID can be initialized with a GET parameter. _e former can
be achieved with a Set-Cookie header or with injection of the lesser used <META http-
equiv> tag, which allows for arbitrary headers to be set. _e META tag allows for the
attack to be performed even by a proxy that can only modify the HTTP document body.
[30] Session ûxation can be universally prevented by issuing a new Session token on the
server-side each time there is a new authentication event on the part of the client, for ex-
ample, the time at which a username and password is provided.
1.3.4 Physical Access
If the attacker has physical access to amachine, it is trivial to obtain session credentials
from ûles stored by the victim’s user agent. Once an attacker has obtained the bearer token,
he or she can perform unlimited actions on behalf of the user for the duration of session,
which can oen be extended by the attacker indeûnitely.
91.3.5 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Although not a direct SessionHijacking vulnerability, Cross-SiteRequest Forgerymust
be mentioned here, as it is one of the more severe web vulnerabilities that allow actions
to be taken on a user’s behalf. For the most part, unwanted cross-domain requests are
prevented by the browser’s Same Origin Policy (SOP). _is is the policy that prevents one
website frommaking a JavaScript-based request for data that resides on a diòerent domain.
However, there is a casewhere the SOP does not aid in protecting from unwanted external
requests: GET requests that mutate state on the server-side. A sign of poor understanding
ofHTTP, having such GET endpoints opens an application to denial-of-service and allows
actions to be performed on behalf of users without their knowledge.
In the ideal attack scenario for CSRF, there is a GET endpoint served by the target ap-
plication that performs some desirable action, e.g. creating a ûnancial transaction (which
should be done with a POST). _e attacker places a reference to this URI in a <script>,
<img> or <link> tag on a page that they control. _ey then coerce the victim to visit
the page (or perhaps view their payload on an advertisement on a popular website). Upon
attempting to load the specially craed resource URI, the victim’s browser will make the
sensitive request to the target domain, andmake a request to perform the privileged action,
including the victim’s session token. _is means CSRF is an invisible attack for the victim
that can be performed oò-domain and leverage an active session.
_ere are two primarymitigations forCSRF. One is to notmutate any state behind GET
endpoints, keeping those endpoints read-only and cacheable. However, it should be noted
that HTTP POST endpoints that expect multipart/form-data can receive cross-site
requests from a hidden form placed on amalicious domain and submitted via JavaScript.
_erefore, the only true mitigation is to place a pseudorandom value on each page of the
origin domain that must be included with any subsequent HTTP request. _is is called an
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anti-CSRF token.
1.4 _e Session Extension Attack
In the abstract, the purpose of issuing an expiry time for an authenticated session is to
enforce a known maximum elapsed time between acquisitions of credentials from a user.
_is is a contract that the user should expect from a secure web application; if the user
provides their secrets to begin a session, the session should only be valid for a speciûc
amount of time deûned by the moment at which those secrets were divulged. _erefore,
it would be counterproductive to upholding this contract if any user request was able to
extend the length of a session without requiring re-authentication. However, in some web
application frameworks, the session expiry time is extended every time that session data is
modiûed. [20]
An attacker could take advantage of this vulnerability by periodically sending requests
to the server known tomodify session data in some innocuousway, for example toggling a
ag used to show or hide help information on the page. In thisway the attacker could keep
a stolen session “alive” for much longer than the intended expiry time, even indeûnitely.
For those frameworks which are vulnerable, this nulliûes any potential beneût of regular
session tokens having a speciûed expiry time. Of course, a pre-requisite for this exploit is
the acquisition of an active session token, which Session Armor prevents entirely.
In some cases, the expiration time of a session cannot be veriûed by the server, so any
mitigation would seem fruitless. An example is a session ID implemented with a regular
cookie that does not embed a cryptographically signed session expiration time.
In all cases, it is important to protect against session extension, because it limits the
duration that the client’s user agentwill keep the bearer token in memory or on disk,mak-
ing it available to an attacker. Most importantly, it limits the time period for which a given
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bearer token is valid. Prevention of this exploit is fairly simple, the expiration time of a
session token must never bemodiûed without re-authentication from the user.
1.5 Rogue Browser Extensions
Another method for cookie exûltration is the use of a malicious browser extension.
_ese add-ons,which add functionality to browsers such as screenshot-taking, bookmark-
management, and custom styling, can surprisingly be given permission to access all cook-
ies stored by the browser without limitation.
_e permissive environment available to browser extensions periodically receives crit-
ical attention [25], but little has been done to address the issue. Major browsers require
extensions to request a speciûc permission for unfettered cookie access, and have an auto-
mated approval process that scans extensions for malicious behavior. Despite these eòorts,
the dialog presented to the user indicating the extent of the add-on’s capabilities is much
too tame. Installing one of these add-ons for any length of time gives it permission to send
authenticated bearer tokens for all logged-inweb applications to a remote party. Although
browser vendors may claim that they check for this activity, any function which operates
on cookies and is loaded via a third-party script can bemodiûed at runtime to exhibit this
behavior. _e loading of third-party code into browser extensions is not only possible but
encouraged by the developer documentation [19]. Compare the warning for this capabil-
ity, 1.2, to the one presented for a potential compromise of an encrypted tunnel to a single
domain, ûg. 1.3.
Not only is the extensionwarning less imposing, but there is alsomuch less user friction
in allowing it. _e TLS warning requires the user to ûrst click “Advanced” and then click a
small grey link if they wish to ignore the vulnerability. Ideally, the browser would present
the extension warning with the same level of severity. _is is a classic trade-oò between
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Figure 1.2: Warning dialog for installing a browser extension with unlimited cookie per-
missions
Figure 1.3:Warning dialog for visiting a domain with an expired TLS certiûcate
convenience and security. _is research used a browser extension to analyze cookie usage
across the web, and it would not have been possible without this capability.
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2. Observing Session Hijacking of ExistingWeb Applications
2.1 SessionJack
A tool called sessionjack was written to gather data on cookie protection, and sup-
port the claims of: the widespread use of bearer tokens, common vulnerabilities, and ex-
cessive session lifetimes. _is tool can be used for analysis of Session Hijacking vulnera-
bilities in any web application. SessionJack was used to analyze the authentication mecha-
nismof 108web applications, spanning a range of popularity from rank 1 to rank 3,489,038
as reported by the traõc analytics company Alexa Internet, Inc. _e following data was
recorded:
• Whether or not the site was vulnerable to Bearer Token Exûltration
• Whether or not the site was vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
• Whether or not the site was vulnerable to Packet Sniõng (Sidejacking)
• Average of all token lifetimes if vulnerable to both XSS and Sidejacking
• Average of protected token lifetimes if protected from XSS
• Average of protected token lifetimes if protected from Sidejacking
To verify that these websites were indeed vulnerable if SessionJack marked them as
such, a web browser add-on was used to load the vulnerable cookies and observe that the
session was still active. _e most noteworthy ûnding from this data was that all 108 sites
were vulnerable to bearer token extraction. _e meaning of this in practical terms is that
nearly allweb applications today, from the highest to lowest proûle, are storing a persistent
token in a cookie or GET parameter, which can be re-used to make authenticated requests
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Figure 2.1: Number of sites that are vulnerable to a Session Hijacking attack via Cross-Site
Scripting, Sidejacking, and Bearer Token Extraction
of the application. Cookies are protected by the browser via the same-origin policy, which
enforces that script running on one domain cannot read cookies stored for another do-
main. However, there aremultipleways that cookies can be exûltrated silently by a remote
adversary as discussed in the prior section.
In ûg. 2.1 the number of sites potentially vulnerable to XSS, Sidejacking and Bearer
Token Extraction are plotted. _e ratios are 31.48%, 56.48%, and 100% respectively. Table
table 2.1 includes a selection of the vulnerability data. A complete listing can be found in
Appendix B.
2.1.1 Analysis of Bearer Token Vulnerabilities
In ûg. 2.2 the popularity rank is plotted for sites that are vulnerable and sites are not
vulnerable to Session Sidejacking. More popular sites have a lower rank, for example,
google.com has rank #1. A summary is provided in table 2.2. We can say that, on av-
erage, websites that protect against Session Sidejacking are higher-proûle, more popular
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Table 2.1: Domain Susceptibility to Session Hijacking
Domain Bearer Tokens XSS Packet Sniõng
mail.google.com Vulnerable Protected Protected
amazon.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable
instagram.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected
alibaba.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable
venmo.com Vulnerable Protected Protected
tdbank.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable
wordpress.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected
paypal.com Vulnerable Protected Protected
Table 2.2: Mitigation of Session Sidejacking by Alexa Rank
Count Mean Alexa Rank Median Alexa Rank
Total 108 63109 4296
Does Mitigate 47 6040 1198
Does Not Mitigate 61 103248 11012
sites. However, the diòerence in themean between those that are protected and those that
are vulnerable is less than one standard deviation of the distribution of those sites tested.
We can therefore draw the conclusion that a signiûcant number of high-proûle websites
are vulnerable to Session Sidejacking. _ese sites span a variety of industries and classes of
risk for the user. _ey include: (entertainment) twitch.tv, steampowered.com, netix.com,
(shopping) alibaba.com, amazon.com, ebay.com, and (ûnance) tdbank.com, chase.com.
_e relationship between popularity rank and vulnerability to Cross-Site Scripting is
plotted in a similar fashion in ûg. 2.3 and summarized in table 2.3. Comparing the tabular
data for both,we can see that a larger proportion of sites use the HTTPOnly ag than those
that use the Secure ag. _is makes sense from a project management standpoint. In
the development ofmostweb applications, it is easier to enforce that JavaScript is not used
to access the session token, than it is to deploy always-on HTTPS. In the same manner
as for Session Sidejacking, we can draw two major conclusions: on average, higher pro-
ûle sites protect against Cross-Site Scripting, and yet a signiûcant number of high-proûle
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Figure 2.2: Alexa rank forwebsiteswhichmitigate Session Sidejacking and those that don’t
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Figure 2.3: Alexa rank forwebsiteswhichmitigate Cross-Site Scripting and those that don’t
websites are vulnerable. _ese vulnerable sites span a variety of industries and classes of
risk. _ey include: (business services) ibm.com, oracle.com, myminifactory.com, (enter-
tainment) hitbox.tv, kongregate.com, soundcloud, and (ûnance) tdbank.com.
_e vulnerabilities observed for major American banks and top-100 websites is dis-
heartening,when enabling these slightprotections represents little development cost. Some
of the vulnerabilities are particularly noteworthy. Airdroid.com is a service which allows
unrestricted access to an Android phone via a web application. Airdroid has made the
following claim, “Your data security is among the top priorities of AirDroid and industry
standards are strictly implemented.” However, it is vulnerable to both Session Sidejacking
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Table 2.3: Mitigation of Cross-Site Scripting by Alexa Rank
Count Mean Alexa Rank Median Alexa Rank
Total 108 63109 4296
Does Mitigate 74 24102 3534
Does Not Mitigate 34 148004 5445
and Cross-Site Scripting. Hitbox.tv, a popular streaming video service, persists sessions in
awaydistinct from all of theother 107 sites analyzed. It stores the sessionbearer tokenusing
the localStorageAPI, and restores a session cookie using this information even if cook-
ies are cleared. _is means that even if the session cookie were protected with httpOnly,
any JavaScript, domain-wide, can access the token via the localStorageAPI,which has
no protection from access. _is is an interestingway to “resist” cookie-clearing behavior of
users, but makes the sitemore vulnerable to attack. Regardless, hitbox.tv does not protect
its session cookies from either of the two attacks under consideration.
_e developer access website of Oculus.com also has an uncommon way of obtain-
ing its bearer token. It uses JSONP to make a cross-domain request to graph.oculus.com
to retrieve an authenticated OAuth2 session token. _is token is protected from both at-
tacks, but it reveals a weakness of OAuth: although the authentication protocol is slightly
more complicated than the usual POST request and Set-Cookie: response, when im-
plemented in a web browser, it results in the same weakness of the traditional scheme: a
static bearer token is persisted with the client for a possibly indeûnite period of time.
One potential argument against enabling Sidejacking protection, is that it also requires
that all requests are transmitted via HTTPS, which can be expensive to deploy. However,
some of the sites which are vulnerable are clearlymaking an attempt to be “HTTPS only”,
but have not fully protected their users. _ese sites redirect any insecure request to an
HTTPS URL using by using responses HTTP 302, “Found”, or better HTTP 301, “Moved
Permanently”, which instructs the browser to cache the secure origin indeûnitely. _ere
19
is an ever better protection deûned in RFC 6797 [26], “HTTP Strict Transport Security”
(HSTS), which instructs the browser to enforce that all future requests to this domain use
HTTPS.
Sites that implement this redirection technique should be using HSTS, but many are
not. _is results in the exposure of an HTTP downgrade attack. _is is a simple attack
to carry out on an unprotected network, or when DNS poisoning is possible. _e attacker
entices the victim to make a non-HTTPS request to the target domain via any number of
means. Most simply, the attacker can present a link to the domain in an email or other com-
municationmedium. Another options is to replace an image src attribute on an unrelated
domain with an insecure location on the target domain. [44] In this way, the victim will
not recall interacting with the target domain at the time of the attack. In all cases, as soon
as the victim’s browser visits an HTTP location for the domain, their session cookie will
be sent in the clear on the network. Domains that attempt tomitigate but are vulnerable to
this downgrade include: ibm.com, tdbank.com, bitcoin.cz, chase.com, and codechef.com.
Two out of the 108 sites analyzed were using a particularly insecure technique for ses-
sion persistence which was common before cookies were introduced to the web by Mon-
tulli in 1996 [35]. _is being the inclusion of a session token as a GET parameter on every
URL rendered on the page. Doing this has an important security implication. _e path
of a GET request is much more likely to be logged, cached, or stored in other ways than
the body of a POST request. For example, it will be saved in a bookmark, pasted into an
email, logged by a proxy, and appear on a network monitoring tool. _e two websites that
do this are usaco.org and fourmilab.ch. _is is somewhat understandable, as both of these
websites have been online since before 1998.
_ere are also some impressive standouts in terms of Session Hijacking mitigation.
Intuit.com, the tax preparation service, protects against both sidejacking and XSS using
the standard ags. In addition, it uses a heuristic to determine if the application is being
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accessed from an unknown device. If it is, a one-time code is emailed to the user before lo-
gin can proceed. _is is close to implementing second factor of authentication, “something
you have”, however it is really an additional “something you know” factor. So, this could be
considered amethod for implementing 1.5 factor authentication. Venmo.com, the person-
to-person payments system, mitigates against both common vulnerabilities, and also the
HTTP downgrade attack by using HSTS with an expiry of 1 year, meaning that they do
not expect to serve an insecure HTTP request for a period of one year following any re-
cent request. Intuit one-ups this by using amax-age parameter of 0. _ey expect to never
serve an insecureHTTP request again. _e combination of these techniques is an excellent
example of current best practices.
2.1.2 Analysis of Bearer Token Lifetime
_ere are few parameters of web session security currently under the control of the
application developer, one of them is session lifetime. _is is the duration for which a
generated bearer token is valid. _e longer this period of time, themore opportunity there
is for an attacker to obtain and use the token without the victim’s knowledge. For high
risk applications, such as government, ûnance, or health, a value of 30 minutes would be
reasonable. For low-risk applications, such as entertainment or an enthusiast community,
30 days is the recommended upper limit.
_e plot in ûg. 2.4 compares cookie lifetime in days against the popularity of websites
as measured by their Alexa rank. Points in blue are all cookies from web applications that
are vulnerable to both Sidejacking and XSS. Points in red are the all Secure cookies from
those siteswhichmitigate Sidejacking. Points in yellow are all httpOnly cookies for those
sites which mitigate XSS.
_ere are no apparent trends in this data. Even some of the most popular sites have
extremely long-lived tokens, and some of least popular sites have short-lived ones. Only
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Figure 2.4: Token lifetimes vs site popularity for each type of hijacking protection
a few sites have cookies which are limited to 30 days of validity, and even less limit this to
less than 1 day. _ere is no clustering among cookies that mitigate a certain vulnerability.
_erefore, the primary conclusion thatwe can draw is that there is no relationship in prac-
tice between the choice of session lifetime and the use of these protections. _is informed
the enforcement of amaximum session lifetime of 30 days for the SessionArmor protocol.
2.2 JackHammer
Another tool was written called JackHammer which demonstrates Session Hijacking
vulnerabilities live, using two web browsers to observe the attack. JackHammer includes
a Google Chrome extension, aMozilla Firefox extension, and a websocket server written
in Python. Websocket is a JavaScript API that allows on-page web scripts to maintain
persistent connections with a server.
JackHammer operates as follows. When each browser is initialized, its respective ex-
tension connects to the local websocket server if it is available. _en, the user visits a
webpage on Chrome for which they would like to simulate a hijacking attack. _ey log in
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to the application in order to obtain an active session token. _ey can then right click on
the page and choose “JackHammer” to open a new tabwith the user interface. A list of peer
Firefox browsers which have connected to the local websocket server is displayed. A but-
ton can be clicked which clears all cookies for the selected domain in the Firefox browser.
At this point the user should observe that they are logged in to the application on Chrome
but not on Firefox, this can be seen in ûg. 2.5. _e Chrome browser is on the le, which
simulates the victim. _e Firefox browser is on right, which simulates the attacker. _e
user can then click one of three buttons to simulate a Session Hijacking attack.
• Bearer Tokens tests if the site’s session is vulnerable if all of its cookies can be exûl-
trated
• Cross-Site Scripting tests if the site’s session is vulnerable if its cookies without the
HTTPOnly ag can be exûltrated
• Packet Sniõng tests if the site’s session is vulnerable if its cookies without the Se-
cure ag can be exûltrated.
Upon pressing one of these buttons, the websocket server is used to transfer the vul-
nerable cookies from Chrome to Firefox. A Firefox notiûcation appears indicating how
many cookieswere transferred. _is can be seen in ûg. 2.6, inwhich the user has chosen to
test for Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability. _e user can then refresh the page in the Firefox
browser and note if they remain logged in to the application. _is can be seen in ûg. 2.7.
Note that this website is potentially vulnerable to an XSS attack, as personal information











































































































































3. Existing Session Hijacking Mitigation Techniques
3.1 Standards for Session Token Protection
Session tokens are most commonly cookies, stored in the browser and automatically
included in each request from the client. _e cookiemay be set client-side, via JavaScript,
or server-side, via anyHTTP response from the web application domain. At the time that
the cookie is set, there are options that can be used to enhance security. Sometimes these
options aremisunderstood or ignored by application developers.
3.1.1 HTTPOnly
HTTPOnly is a ag that can be set when storing a Cookie. _is ag indicates to the
browser that the Cookie should not be readable by JavaScript, and thusmitigates the eòects
of a Cross-Site Scripting attack. However, there have been browser bugs in the past that
allowed JavaScript to readHTTPOnly cookies. [23] Session IDs are a highly valuable target
for a malicious actor because they allow unlimited forged requests. Clearly, it would be
beneûcial if there were a mechanism for secure storage of session information that was
inaccessible to any client-side scripts, including browser extensions. _e Session Armor
protocol proposes an encrypted storage location in browsers, inaccessible from all types of
client-side scripts, to be used speciûcally for the storage of session secrets.
3.1.2 Secure
Secure is a similar ag for HTTP cookies. It indicates that a cookie should never
be sent over a non-SSL or non-TLS secured connection. _is does eòectively mitigate
most network-based attack vectors for Session Hijacking. However, if this ag is set, and
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HTTPOnly is not, the cookie remains vulnerable toXSS.Also the cookiemay be logged un-
encrypted or exûltrated on either side of the the TLS termination (for example by a reverse
proxy or rouge browser extension). SessionArmor enables authentication for which the
data being transmitted over the network is not a valuable payload by using a mechanism
for absolute replay prevention. _is obviates the need for a secure tunnel in maintaining
the integrity of user authentication.
3.1.3 Expiration Time
When a cookie is set, it is possible to specify an expiration time. If no expiration time
is set, then the cookie is deleted when the user’s browser is closed. If session tokens are
used, it is advisable to set the expiry time to as early as is reasonable given the sensitivity
of the application. However, in practice, web applications oen set session tokens that last
for months or even years as discussed in section 2.1.2. _is gives an attacker ample time to
exploit a session hijack without being noticed.
3.1.4 HSTS
Of course, integrity, secrecy, and authentication are accomplished by “always-on” TLS.
However, as noted earlier, TLS can be expensive to deploy for multiple subdomains and
when using geographically distributed reverse-proxies. HTTP Strict Transport Security is
a an IETF standards track speciûcation now in use by some websites. It speciûes an HTTP
header that instructs the browser to never request a resource from a particular domain
using an insecure connection. _is a means for Sidejacking vectors of cookie leakage to
“fail closed”, a desirable security property in many situations.
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3.1.5 HTTPDigest Authentication
Interestingly, HTTP has had since 1997 [24] a speciûcation for request authentication
that does not use cookies at all. It deûnes a session as the period of time during which the
solution to a cryptographic challenge is valid for a given user, and does not store a ses-
sion secret in a JavaScript accessible location. _is is HTTP Digest Authentication, which
operates in the following way.
When a user makes a request for a protected resource, the server responds with sta-
tus code 401, Unauthorized, and also includes a WWW-Authenticate: header ûeld. _is
header ûeld includes data that is used by the browser to instruct users that theymust pro-
vide a speciûc set of authentication credentials in order to continue, and also informs the
browser of parameters that the authentication mechanism will use. _ese parameters in-
clude a nonce from the server, an opaque token, and an indication if request body integrity
should be computed for each request.
_e server then only responds with data to subsequent requests if the following con-
ditions are met. _e browser must respond with a “digest”, which is a hash-based mes-
sage authentication code (HMAC). HMAC is mechanism by which an entity can prove
knowledge of a secret without revealing the secret itself. Also, in the process, HMAC
authenticates the origin of some data as being an entity with knowledge of the secret.
_e general construction of an HMAC is a function with two parameters: the key, and the
data to be authenticated.
HMAC(key, data) ∶= H(key⊕ ipad,H(key⊕ opad, data)) (3.1)
WithHMAC,H is any cryptographically-strong hash function, i.e. a lossy compression
function that is collision resistant. _e value of an HMAC result, the “MAC”, is something
which can be recomputed by an entity which challenges the authenticity of the data, and
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Figure 3.1: Username and password dialog box for HTTP Digest Authentication
must have access to the key. _e ipad and opad are used to prevent length-extension attacks
on the data. [7] Digest authentication actually uses only a single iteration of the hash-
function and so it is potentially susceptible to these attacks.
In the case of Digest Authentication, the key is itself is a hash of the user’s username
and password. _e authenticated data is a nonce from the server, a nonce from the client,
a counter from the client, the requested path, and optionally the requested body data. _e
ûrst two allow the client and server tomutually authenticate, although this is optional. _e
counter allows the server to provide absolute replay prevention, although this is optional.
_ese optional components weaken its security properties. _ere is also no mechanism
for the client to authenticate header data, or enforce that time-based replay prevention be
used by the server.
Despite these shortcomingsdigest authentication ismuchmore secure than cookies be-
cause each request is authenticated individually. Unfortunately, one of the primary reasons
that it is not used bymost web applications is that there is no control over the appearance
of the username and password dialog, which looks like the one seen in ûg. 3.1.
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3.2 ProposedMethods for Session Protection
3.2.1 Secure Cookie Protocol
In 2005, Liu et al. [32] proposed a cookie protocol with the goals of authentication,
conûdentiality, integrity, and anti-replay. _ey ûrst present a related cookie protocol from
Fu et al. [21] that relied on the following two ûelds to be to be set in a cookie by the server:
• Username ∣ Expiration Time ∣ Data
• HMAC(sk, Username ∣ Expiration Time ∣ Data)
Where sk is a global server secret, and Data is any data that the server wishes to re-
member about the client. _ey note that this protocol has three weaknesses: lack of conû-
dentiality, no resistance to replay, and lack of resistance to volume attacks. An alternative
protocol is then presented that aims to correct these aws. It has the server set a cookie
with the following two ûelds.
• Username ∣ Expiration Time ∣ E(k, Data)
• HMAC(k, Username ∣ Expiration Time ∣ Data ∣ Session Key)
– Where k =HMAC(sk, Username ∣ Expiration Time)
_e server key, sk, is known only by the server and used for all sessions. _e derived
key, k, can be computed only by the server. _e claim of conûdentiality comes from the
fact that only the server can decrypt “Data”, using a key that is derived per-session. _is
claim appears to be sound, althoughweb applications oen retrieve session data from some
persistent medium once they can validate an authenticated request, obviating the need for
this token.
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_e proposed method for anti-replay comes in the form of Session Key, which is pre-
sented as the SSL session key for the connection between the server and client. _e concept
being that even if recorded SSL traõc is cracked via some means, the attacker would not
know the SSL session key. _ere are two aws with this scheme. First, the SSL session key
in all hardened implementations is not accessible via any application programming inter-
face, and so thisHTTP sessionmechanismwould have to be deployed in conjunctionwith
amodiûed SSL stack. Also, by deûnition, if SSL traõc has been decrypted to the point that
an entire cookie is recovered then the attacker is likely in possession of the session key.
_ey present “volume attacks” in the ûrst protocol as being attacks on the underlying
hash algorithm if the same key is used for all cookies. _is is a legitimate concern and their
solution is reasonable because the derived key includes a time component. SessionArmor
also does not re-useHMAC keys. Amajor drawback of both of there protocols is the lack
of per-request authentication, they do not authenticate user intent.
3.2.2 SessionLock
In 2008 Aida et al. conceived of SessionLock. [1]_e primary concept is that it revives
the notion of a session key stored within each URI on the client webpage. However, rather
than use GET parameters, which are preceded by a “?” in the path, it uses the fragment
identiûer, which is preceded by a “#”. _e diòerence between a fragment identiûer and a
GET parameter from a security standpoint is that a fragment identiûer never leaves the
browserwhen requests aremade. _us, their protocol is not subject to eavesdropping. _e
session key is transferred to the client via a Secure cookie, atwhich point the session may
be downgraded to standardHTTP.
Message integrity isprovidedby anHMACwith each request computedusing a JavaScript
implementation of SHA-1. JavaScript automatically adds event handlers for all link-clicks,
form-submits, and XHR requests, to intercept and add the HMAC. _e session key is
32
“transferred” from page to page by executing a JavaScript function which appends the key
as a fragment to everyURI on the page upon page load. Essentially, the fragment identiûer
is used as a “safer” storage location for the HMAC key than a cookie, because it is never
sent over the network.
One nice feature is that a mechanism is provided to restore the session key if a user
clicks a link “too quickly” for it to have beenplaced in the fragment by JavaScript. _is same
mechanism highlights that SessionLock is clearly vulnerable to an XSS attack. Ifmalicious
JavaScript were to execute in the context of the application, the HMAC secret would be
strewn throughout the page and easily accessible. Interestingly enough, it is highly resistant
to CSRF, because the HMAC key can only be obtained by JavaScript running on the ûrst-
party domain. Session Lock does not specify the exact ûelds which should be included in
theHMAC.
3.2.3 Web Key
In 2008 Close conceived ofWeb-Key [13],which is similar to SessionLock in that it uses
URL fragments sent by the server for authentication, which are assumed to be sent over
TLS. Rather than reject the notion that “fragment-added” URLs might be bookmarked or
inadvertently shared by the user as in [2],Web-Key embraces this, each URL fragment is
unique and represents a diòerent “capability based” permission. For example, a usermight
share aURL that gives a friend permanent access to view a ûle but does not allow access to
any other resource. Close rejects the notion of “ambient credentials”, i.e. cookies, and goes
so far as to propose that ifWeb-Key was in place then the same origin policy would not be
necessary.
Web-Key at ûrst appears to be a solid concept, but there is a strange omission in the
presentation: an explanation of how the user obtains theURI-based credentials in the ûrst
place. Each resource is supposedly protected by a unique URL fragment key. Web-Key
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presents the scenario inwhich the link for a sensitive resourcemight be indexed by a search
engine, meaning that web-key protected URIs are sent as part of the body of HTTP re-
sponses. If this is the case, then providing access to a single root type resource viaWeb-Key
is equivalent to providing access to all resources reachable from it in the web graph. _e
authorswrite, “Aweb application usingweb-keys in eòect generates passwords on behalf of
the user.” _is might seem like a welcome paradigm shi, but in practice, as soon as a user
mistakenly links to a URI with a sensitiveWeb-Key, all of that user’s private information
would be available for public access.
3.2.4 HTTPI
HTTPI is a transport protocol proposed by Choi and Gouda in 2011 [12]. Its primary
goal is to provide a middle of the road option between HTTP and HTTPS. _e authors
note that HTTP is inexpensive to use and is easily accommodated by middle boxes on
the internet, such as caching proxies and distributed content delivery networks, whereas
HTTPS is the opposite in both respects. HTTPI promises to createmessage integrity with
limited cryptographic overhead but doesnot seek to provide secrecy. _e protocol operates
as follows:
1. _e web client and server negotiate a session key using a “TLS-like” protocol.
2. _e server assigns theweb client a Session ID, and allocates resources for the session
3. Each subsequent message contains the session id and an HMAC keyed using the
session key. _is uses SHA-1 for all immutable ûelds in the header, including cookies
4. _e Content-MD5 header from HTTP is required rather than optional. _ey note
that SHA-1 could be used here, but feel that MD5 is suõcient and is already imple-
mented on most middle box soware.
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Interestingly, to avoid the attack that will be demonstrated in section 3.2.6, the entire
certiûcate signing infrastructure of TLS would be necessary for the “TLS-like” protocol to
be secure. _is is an unrealistic burden that is largely ignored in the presentation. _ey
propose that theHMAC header ûelds be treated as end-to-end immutable headers as some
have been speciûed. _is ensures that the server can verify the integrity of each request by
performing a hash using the predetermined session key. Also, because the Content-MD5
header is not a MAC and is separate from the SHA-1, it can be used to cache the same
content for multiple clients, and also avoid caching of duplicate content. Another positive
aspect ofHTTPI is its performance, which is within 2% ofHTTP.
HTTPI has some weaknesses when it comes to session protection. An attacker can
eavesdrop on the connection and use the plaintext Session ID to replay requests. _ere is
neither time-based nor nonce-based replay prevention. However, an attacker cannot re-
quest additional resources or injectnewGET orPOSTparametersdue to theHMAC._ere
is some protection against XSS because the session key is not accessible via JavaScript.
However, there isnoprotection againstCSRF, because the browserwill perform theHMAC
on the user’s behalf. Another insecure aspect of HTTPI is that it promotes long-lived ses-
sions as a feature, which increases the chance of replay attacks. _ere are known collision
attacks against MD5, so using it for request body integrity is not secure. Most notably, they
demonstrate that a web-cache would need access to a session’s HMAC key in order to val-
idate a request before sending a response. _is undermines their claim of cacheability as a
primary contribution of the protocol.
3.2.5 One Time Cookies
In 2012, Dacosta et al. [14] createdOneTime Cookies, an unencrypted session protocol
with the goal ofmessage integrity and the prevention of replay attacks. A second goal was
limiting the state required by the application, to ease deployment in a highly distributed
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environment. _e protocol operates as follows.
1. _e user makes a request via TLS to the server including an HTTP header, X-OTC:,
username, and password
2. _e server responds via TLSwith a non-cookieHTTP Header that includes in plain-
text a nonce, expiration time for the session, session key, and domain/path forwhich
the session key is valid. It also includes an opaque value computed via symmetric
encryption for which the key is an XOR of a server-only key and the nonce. _e
values encrypted are the user id, session key, and expiration time for the session.
3. When a usermakes any request, in the clear they include: the nonce, a single-request
expiration time, and an HMAC. _e data authenticated is the url, the single-request
expiration time, and the data of the request, keyed by the session key. _ey also
include the opaque value sent by the server.
4. _e server receives the request, and proceeds to decrypt the opaque via symmetric
encryption using its secret XORed with the nonce. _e server now has access to
the session key, user id, and session expiration time with no database access. _ese
values are used to verify theHMAC. _e request is dropped if theHMAC is invalid
or if its individual expiration time has expired.
_is method, dubbed OTC, has some advantages. It prevents XSS because the session
key is not accessible via JavaScript, rather theHMACwas implemented as a browser exten-
sion. It provides message integrity via theHMAC, and prevents replay via the per-request
expiration time, recommended to be 30 seconds. Perhaps the greatest advantage is that it
requires no database access, even for the user id. _e only attack of those described above
towhich it is vulnerable isCSRF, again because the browser performs theHMAC on behalf
of any request to a given domain.
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Some disadvantages of OTC were observed in the reference implementation source
code provided by the author. It did not authenticate HTTP headers, presumably because
some headers are modiûed in-transit by web servers and reverse proxies. It did not au-
thenticate the request body of POST or PUT requests. It also does not oòer absolute replay
prevention.
3.2.6 SecSess
Published in 2015 by De Ryck et al., SecSess [15] is another HMAC-based protocol for
maintaining authenticated user sessions. Its primary contribution is the way in which the
HMAC secret key is determined by the client and server. _eir claim is that by using
the Hughes variant of the Diõe-Hellman key exchange protocol [27], the client is able to
choose theHMAC key in advance of sending the ûrst request, and thus authenticate to the
server their intent to begin a session. Upon receiving the ûrst request, the server allocates
some persistent storage for both a Session ID (with associated state) and an HMAC key,
which it will know eventually. It responds to the ûrst request with its public component
of the DHE, Y . _e client then continues to HMAC subsequent requests and provide its
public component of the DHE, X.
_eir claim is that this prevents the scenariowhich “allows an eavesdropper to respond
to the ûrst response, injecting his key material into the session”. _ey are referring to the
following scenario with a non-Hughes Diõe-Hellman exchange.
1. A legitimate end-user makes a request to begin a new session with no HMAC
2. _e server, using traditional D–H, sends the parameters:
(a) p, the primemodulus
(b) g, the primitive root modulo p
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(c) A = gamodp
(d) _e Session ID
3. A attackingman-in-the-middle respondswith B = gbmodp, to the server, and stores
the Session ID
4. _e attacker responds to the legitimate end-user with its own choice for the D–H
parameters and Session ID.
5. _e attacker ignores theHMAC of the requests from the client,modiûes the client’s
requests, and signs them using the secret uponwhich the attacker and server agreed.
By using theHughes variant of Diõe-Hellman, itwould appear that the attacker cannot
interpose with its own secret in this way, because the client chooses the secret in advance.
However, this is not the case. _e attacker can still perform the following sequence of
operations.
1. A legitimate end-user requests to begin a new session with an HMAC, and provides
the D–H parameters p and g
2. _e attacker,withman-in-the-middle capability, thenmakes a similar request to the
legitimate server.
3. _e server responds to the attacker with the public component of its newly and ran-
domly generatedHughes parameters, Y , and a Session ID.
4. _e attacker makes another request to the server with its public component of the
Hughes parameters, X, corresponding to the attacker’s own request in step 2.
5. _e attacker responds to the legitimate userwith the server’s response, including the
Session ID, butwith the public component ofnewly and randomly generatedHughes
parameters, Y .
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6. _e legitimate user responds to the attacker with its public component, X, and be-
lieves it has shared its secret with the legitimate server.
7. _e attacker now ignores theHMAC of requests from the client,modiûes the client’s
requests, and produces its own HMAC for requests using the obtained Session ID
and the attacker’s chosen secret.
_e reason that this ispossible is thatneither version ofDiõe-Hellman support authen-
tication. _e “public key” used by the server is randomly generated for each exchange, and
is not signed by some well-known authority. _is was a critical oversight in the develop-
ment of SecSess. _e notion that there is some advantage to being able to send an HMAC
with the ûrst request also holds no weight. _e purpose of theHMAC is to validate that a
request is genuine, and drop any response if it is not. _e fact that the server will respond
to the initial request without being able to validate theHMACmeans that the ûrst HMAC
has no purpose. SecSess goes even further in permitting responses without ûrst validat-
ing theHMAC, “SecSess addresses [droppedmessages] by continuing to send the [client’s]
public component as long as the server has not conûrmed the session establishment.”
An additional disadvantage of SecSess is that it doesnot specify the input to theHMAC.
It uses this property to demonstrate that it operates in the presence of caching proxies,
claimed to be a beneût. However, if an attacker can replay a request and receive a response
from a cache, then there isno replaypreventionmechanism enabled by theHMAC.Despite
this, SecSess has at least one good design property. It explicitly speciûes that session secrets
must be persisted in a secure location, inaccessible from on-page JavaScript.
3.3 SessionArmor Compared to Existing Methods
Like many of the methods just discussed, SessionArmor uses an HMAC to authenti-
cate user requests in the context of an HTTP application. However, the way in which it
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uses the HMAC diòerentiates it from all previous methods. SessionArmor is completely
speciûed in terms of its HMAC inputs, which gives it ideal request integrity. Robust replay
prevention is implemented using two techniques. Time-based replay prevention is enabled
by including a per-request expiration timestamp in the HMAC. Absolute replay preven-
tion is optionally enabled by including a nonce in the HMAC, which is stored server-side
using a bit-vector compression scheme for minimal deployment overhead.
SessionArmor has conûguration options which allow it to be deployed in the presence
of caching proxies, without any loss of request integrity. Web servers and reverse proxies
have the opportunity to modify some request headers, which makes it impossible to au-
thenticate them as originating from the client. _erefore, SessionArmor has the option to
specify request headers that should be authenticated by the client, and any additional non-
standard headers. For maximum eõciency, this conûguration is transmitted with each
request as a bit vector. By using lightweight conûguration transmitted with each request,
SessionArmor is completely stateless; meaning it can operate behind load balancers and
reverse proxies without any auxiliary database.
SessionArmor does not use cookies or URI fragments to store HMAC keys, instead
choosing a secure location inaccessible from JavaScript, preventing Cross-Site Scripting
vulnerabilities. Unlike all other protocols presented in this section, the use and negotiation
of cryptographic algorithms in SessionArmor is fully speciûed,making it future-proof and
hardened against cryptanalysis. SessionArmor also deûnes a limit on the length of time for
which a session is valid, eliminating the Session Extension attack and reducing the attack
surface in time for Session Hijacking opportunities. _is is further strengthened by spec-
ifying the notion of an inactivity timeout, and implementing it with a stateless technique.
In addition SessionArmor makes preventing Session Fixation a top priority, and will only
begin to secure a session if it can prove that a new session credential has been generated
for a recent authentication event.
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4. _e Session Armor Protocol
Having discussed existing mitigation techniques for the Session Hijacking attack, we
nowpresent the overalldesign and features of SessionArmor. Asmotivatingdesign criteria,
seven goals were laid out before beginning formal speciûcation or implementation of the
protocol. _ey included goals of security, performance, and ease of deployment. _ese are
listed in section 4.1.
In the following section are themajor features and attack mitigation techniques of the
protocol. _ese are a high-level description of what makes SessionArmor novel and valu-
able in the landscape of HTTP authentication mechanisms. For undesirable features that
are speciûcally avoided one can refer to section 3.3.
4.1 Goals of the Protocol
Session Armor aims to meet the following design criteria:
1. Individual Request Authentication
Aman-in-the-middle cannot tamperwith request data to perform actions on a user’s
behalf.
2. Replay Prevention
An attacker cannot replay requests to perform actions on a user’s behalf.
3. Minimal Overhead




No server-side storage should be required, except for that required by nonce-based
replay prevention, if enabled.
5. No Application Modiûcation
Web application code oen relies on the existing Session ID as a bearer token for a
variety of purposes. Session Armor leverages this key rather than replaces it, so that
no changes are needed in the application code.
6. TLS Required During Setup Phase Only
Even on an unencrypted channel, request integrity and replay prevention are guar-
anteed once a session has been established.
7. TLS Protected Applications Beneût
Secrecy and whole-payload integrity are not provided, or the protocol would be a
wholesale re-implementation of TLS. Session Armor can, and should, be used in
conjunction with TLS to mitigate Cross-Site Scripting attacks, and exûltration of
session tokens behind the TLS endpoints.
4.2 Features andMitigation Techniques
4.2.1 Fully Speciûed and ConûgurableHMAC
SessionArmor supplants bearer tokens by generating and including a hash-basedmes-
sage authentication code with each client request. With this property alone, an attacker
cannot perform unlimited actions by capturing requests, as the data of each request is au-
thenticated individually by the server. _eHMAC algorithm used for a given client is cho-
sen by the server from a set presented by the client. _is gives the server an opportunity
42
to choose an algorithm that it trusts for security and performance reasons.
In addition to allowing for a choice ofHMACalgorithm, SessionArmor also provides a
robustmechanism for the server to choose portions of the request thatwill be protected by
theHMAC. _ese inputs are speciûed in their entirety, unlike prior protocols as discussed
in the previous section. _e server can indicate arbitrary header ûelds and non-standard
header ûelds that it would like the client to authenticate. _is conûguration data is trans-
mitted per-client with no server-side state needed in a compact bit-vector format.
4.2.2 Secure Storage ofHMAC key
As discussed in chapter 3 some existing proposals to protect against Session Hijacking
remain vulnerable to XSS. _ey store the session secret in the DOM, in Cookies, or in
the document location. Given how oen XSS vulnerabilities are discovered in even high-
proûle web application, Session Armor takes the stance that the risk of this attack surface
is too high to be allowed. _erefore,HMAC keys must be stored in a location inaccessible
to client-side scripts, including browser extensions. Some browsers do not oòer this type
of protected storage location. _us, a browser standard for secure storage of session data
would be a pre-requisite to a true implementation of SessionArmor as intended. Luckily,
Google Chrome,whichwas used as a platform for the reference implementation, does oòer
isolation of browser extension data.
4.2.3 Careful Choice of Cryptographic Primitives
SessionArmor makes use of two cryptographic primitiveswhich are essential to its op-
eration, a hash function and a block cipher. Any time that these powerful tools are used,
caremust be taken to use them correctly. In the case ofHMAC, there is only oneway to use
the underlying hash function, and so the strength of the HMAC relies entirely upon the
cryptographic strength of the hash function; its tendency to avoid collisions, and produce
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apparently random bit ips for any modiûcation to an input bit. To allow for an upgrade
path to stronger cryptographic hash functions as they are designed, SessionArmor includes
a bit-vector with every message indicating the hash algorithm in use, which is itself pro-
tected by theHMAC.
_e use of a block cipher is somewhat more complex. Block ciphers can operate in
various modes of encryption, which use as input previous output data, counters, and ex-
ternal functions to varying degrees. SessionArmor uses a block cipher only on the server-
side, so the application implementor is in complete control of its operation. _ere are
some modes of operation which have known vulnerabilities, e.g. Electronic Code Book
mode is quite susceptible to frequency analysis, and Cipher Block Chaining mode has a
chosen-ciphertext vulnerability known as the Padding Oracle attack which is described
in section 5.3.2. To prevent this class of attack, SessionArmor speciûes that a strong sym-
metric cipher is used in conjunction with a known-robust Authenticated Encryption with
Associated Data (AEAD) mode of encryption.
4.2.4 Time-based Replay Prevention
Even with request integrity, individual request replay cannot be prevented without ad-
ditional measures in place. Replay can be devastating: the most straightforward example
being a malicious request for a repeated ûnancial transaction. To combat this, Session
Armor uses either time-based or nonce-based replay prevention. With time-based replay
prevention, a timestamp is included in-the-clear and authenticated using theHMAC. _e
server is able to verify that the timestamp has not been tampered with and that some ex-
piration time, e.g. 4 seconds, has not elapsed.
In addition to enforcing individual request expiry. SessionArmor treats session expiry
as a top priority. Sessions cannot last longer than 30 days, and sessions are expired if in-
active for a conûgurable inactivity period. Inactivity timeout leverages the HMAC and is
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implemented using a stateless technique discussed in section section 5.4.2.
4.2.5 Nonce-based Replay Prevention
If the application developer wishes to conûgure Session Armor with a persistent back-
end, such as a relational database or key-value store, then robust, nonce-based replay pre-
vention can be used. In this scheme, amonotonically increasing counter is included with
each request and authenticated using the HMAC. Session Armor stores a bit-vector in-
dicating nonce values that have already been seen, and denies any repeated requests. A
bit-vector lookback scheme is required because web requests are oen made concurrently
and arrive at a server out-of-order.
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5. Formal Speciûcation of the Session Armor Protocol
For any cryptographic protocol to be useful, a formal speciûcation is in order. _is
speciûcation should include an exact and detailed description of all data transferred to
and from any entity in each stage of the protocol, and the purpose of each data ûeld. A
syntax should be employed which allows the speciûcation of required data, optional data,
lists of data, ûeld names, and other operations of the protocol. _e speciûcation should in-
clude examplemessages for eachmessage type, in an encoded and unencoded form. _ere
should also be a description of the protocol in prose that clariûes any potential confusion
or misunderstanding that may arise during implementation. Diagrams should be used to
introduce concepts that have eòective visual metaphors. _e reader of such a speciûcation
should take care to adhere to the use of the terms, “must”, “should”, and “may”, in addition
to their negations. _is chapter presents such a formal speciûcation for SessionArmor.
5.1 Syntax of Parameter Speciûcations
_is document uses the standard parameter speciûcation format employed by Unix
manual pages.
• Required parameters are enclosed in angle brackets:<required>
• Optional parameters are enclosed in brackets:[optional]
• Choices are a comma separated list enclosed in braces:
{choice1, choice2, choice3}
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• Variable length parameters end with a comma then three dots:[param1, param2, ...]
Extensions to these conventions are the following:
• A valuemay be the result of a function invocation, indicated by a name immediately
followed by parameters enclosed in parenthesis:
base64(param1 ∣ param2)
• Concatenation is denoted with the pipe operator. Whitespace surrounding the pipe
operator should not be included in the value:
(part1 ∣ part2)
5.2 Formatting Conventions for HTTP Headers
_e standard for formatting HTTP headers can be found in section 3.2 of RFC 7230.
[18] Standard HTTP headers are oen formatted as as hyphen-separated title case names,
followed by a colon, followed by a single space character, followed by a bare value. HTTP
headers themselves are separated by the sequencex0Dx0A or \r\n. If aweb application de-
veloper wishes to introduce a non-standard header, the convention is to preûx that header
with the sequence “X-”, for example the “X-Forwarded-For:” header, which is used to
indicate the originating IP address when an HTTP request is forwarded through a proxy
or load balancer. Based upon the standard and these conventions, the headers that Session
Armor will use will be preûxed with “X-S-Armor:”.
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5.3 Setup Phase
5.3.1 Client Setup Phase
Both the web client and web server must run an implementation of the Session Armor
protocol in order for it to function. Ideally, Session Armor is built into web browsers on
the client-side and web servers on the server side. For a client to indicate that it supports
Session Armor, it sends a header with every request to all web servers indicating that it
is ready to begin a Session Armor session. _is header also includes the set of HMAC
algorithms that the client supports. Because this header is sent with every client request, it
must be small in size to present minimal overhead in bandwidth consumption.
_e client provides to the serverwith the header X-S-Armor: with every request. _e
initial value used by the client is:
X-S-Armor: r:base64(<byte0><byte1> [byte2,...])
_e value of the header, which is used for all phases of the protocol, is always semi-
colon separated key-value pairs. Each pair is of the format <key>:<value> with the :
being surrounded by no whitespace. _is is similar to the format used by the Set-Cookie
header [6]; however, : is used instead of = because the values in this protocol are oen
base64 encoded, which uses = as a padding character. _e only key in this initial header is
r, which means ‘ready’.
_e value of ‘r’ is a variable-length bitmask. _e ûrst <byte0> is the number of bytes
to follow and <byte1>[byte2,...] are those bytes. _e payload of this header value,
<byte1>[byte2,...], is a bitmask indicating the HMAC algorithms supported by the
client. A given bit in the bitmask with a value of 1 indicates that the client supports one of
the following algorithms. A client must support one or more of these algorithms. _is list
may be expanded over time as part of the protocol standard. Note the absence of SHA-1,
as recent attacks have been developed that undermine its cryptographic strength. [45] For
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an explanation of why HMAC-SHA3 is not currently an option for the HMAC algorithm
see section section 5.6.
Note that this algorithm negotiation is “one-sided”. _at is, the server must support
all of the speciûed algorithms, as there may exist clients which each only support one of
the algorithms. Contrast this with the TLS handshake, in which the server may refuse
service to a client not supporting any of the cipher suites that it does. Future versions
of SessionArmor might support such refusal as attacks are found on these algorithms; but,
there is an evenmore severe issuewithweakenednegotiation in general. _is characteristic
can lead to a so-called downgrade attack. _at is, if a man-in-the-middle were able to
control even this one byte of this client ready message that indicates HMAC support, the
MITM could force the use of theweakest option. Such a downgrade attack iswhat enabled
the POODLE attack on SSL 3.0 to be useful in practice. Browsers choose to diverge from
theTLS speciûcation and retry failedTLS connectionswith SSL 3.0. [36]_e reason thatwe
do not consider this a weakness in SessionArmor is the requirement that the ûrst request-
response pair be conducted over TLS, which thwarts all MITM attacks if used correctly.
Shown in ûg. 5.1 is an example of the client ready header for a client which supports
SHA-256 and SHA-512 only. First, the un-encoded header is shown, with binary notation,
then, the actual encoded header is shown, with base64 notation.
RIPEMD-160 is a 160-bit cryptographic hash function, designed by Hans Dobbertin,
Antoon Bosselaers, and Bart Preneel in 1996 with support from the German Information




Figure 5.1: Client ready header in un-encoded and base64 notation
replacement for the popular 128-bithash functions at the time:MD4,MD5 andRIPEMD. It
has a 160-bit output, similar to SHA-1, although unlike SHA-1, noweaknesses inRIPEMD-
160 have been publicly disclosed. _erefore, RIPEMD is currently considered a strong
alternative to SHA-1 and in some cases SHA-256, when the use of those algorithms is not
desirable.
5.3.2 Server Setup Phase
A server that supports SessionArmormust take no further action in the SessionArmor
protocol until the following conditions have been met. At the time of response:
1. An HTTPS connection is currently established with the client and will be used to
send the current response.
2. _e server has prepared a Set-Cookie: header, containing a Session ID, to send
with the current response.
Condition 1 must be met because the server will send an HMAC key, which must be
kept secret, to the client with this response. It is assumed that if these two conditions
aremet, then the client has just authenticatedwith the server by sending credentials over a
secure tunnel. _erefore, rather than using a cryptographic key exchangemechanism, Ses-
sion Armor takes advantage of the existing secure channel to send the HMAC key. In the
case of a web application framework, which may operate on requests that have TLS termi-
nated upstream by a reverse-proxy or load balancer, the HTTP-X-Forwarded-Proto:,
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or HTTP-X-Forwarded-Protocol: headers may be used to determine the protocol in-
use. Ensure in this case that the proxy is properly conûgured to overwrite the value of
this header with ‘http’ in the case that amalicious party has sent this header to the server
themselves.
_ese requirements do pose a weakness: the server chooses an HMAC key with no
input from the client. _ismeans that if the secure tunnel has been compromised, then the
SessionArmor session has been compromised aswell. However, if this is the case, then the
user’s long-term authentication credentials have also been compromised, and protecting
any session that begins with these credentials is no longer possible. _is choice was made
in support of goal 3 and 7: minimal overhead, and supplementing TLS rather than re-
implementing it.
Condition 2must also bemet for the current response. Initially, a cookie-based session
may or may not be active with the sever, i.e. the client may have a session cookie that
the server is using as a key to persist state related to that client’s current activities on the
site; a so-called “anonymous” session. In this case, historically, many web frameworks
would authenticate a user by bringing up a short-lived HTTPS connection, performing
username and password authentication, and continuing to use the existing Session ID. _is
was a logical aw that enabled a vulnerability called Session Fixation, in which an attacker
obtains a Session ID from the server and uses XSS or network techniques to plant this
Session ID in a target client. _e next time that the client authenticated, the attackerwould
have access to an authenticated session token for that user.
_e propermitigation for this attack is to generate a new Session ID on the same request
in which username and password authentication is taking place, transfer existing session
data for the user to the new token, and issue this new “transferred” Session ID to the au-
thenticated user. An initial Session ID "Set-Cookie:" from the server oen takes place
in the clear, because this tokenwill be sent in the clear in all future requests for the duration
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of the anonymous session. _erefore, by using the two conditions above, Session Armor
can assume that the user has just authenticated, if and only if theweb framework has prop-
erly mitigated against Session Fixation. If it has not, then the SessionArmor protocol will
not continue, and the user will be authenticated viaHTTP Cookie with a stale Session ID.
If possible, SessionArmor detects this case and logs an error for the developer indicating
that there is no mitigation for Session Fixation in use.
Protecting the existing Session ID distinguishes Session Armor from other bearer-
token-avoiding techniques for HTTP authentication. _is is because it leverages rather
than replaces the existing authentication mode ofweb frameworks. SessionArmor can au-
thenticate anonymous session data that has been “upgraded” to authenticated session data,
a common pattern that is not explicitly speciûed by other protocols in this domain.
In general, the name of the Session ID cookie must be accessible to the server-side
Session Armor middleware. Luckily, in many frameworks, e.g. Django, Ruby on Rails,
PHP, and J2EE, the name of this Cookie is a globally accessible and thus does not need to
be conûgured speciûcally for SessionArmor by the developer.
Once the two conditions above are met, then the following actions are performed by
the server to begin a session. _ey should be performed in this order for the sake of per-
formance, i.e. “fail fast”.
1. Server veriûes that the only key-value pair in the X-S-Armor header is r:<value>
2. Server removes the Session ID cookie from the Set-Cookie: header, but leaves
other Cookies intact within the header. _e Session ID is stored in-memory for use
in the next step.
3. Server generates a nonce n that will be used as the initial value for counter-based
replay prevention. Counter-based replay prevention is optional. It is the only feature
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of Session Armor that requires persistent state for the protocol itself on the server-
side, besides Session data itself. nmust be 32 bits.
4. Server encrypts the Session ID using a secret shared among all servers, k
5. Server chooses a key Kh, that will be sent to the client for HMAC use
6. Server sends an X-S-Armor: header with the protocol initialization data to the
client.
_e protocol initialization data are the following keys and values.
s: AESGCM(Server Secret, IV, Session ID ∣ Kh ∣ Session Expiration Time)
iv: Initialization Vector
tag: AEAD tag
kh: HMAC key for the client to keep secret
h: Chosen HMAC algorithm bitmask <byte0><byte1>[byte2,...]
ah: Bitmask of headers to authenticate <byte0><byte1>[byte2,...]
eahs (optional) : Extra headers to authenticate <string0>,[string1,string2,...]
n (optional): Nonce value for replay prevention
Each of the values are base64 encoded to allow transfer of binary data over HTTP,
which is a plaintext protocol. _e value of s is the “opaque” token containing the sensitive
Session ID which is never known to the client. s is decrypted by the server on subsequent
requests.
_e function E is a keyed symmetric cipher. _is cipher operates entirely server-side,
so it can be chosen by the implementer. _is ciphermust be AES-256 or another of equal or
greater strength. AES-256 is recommended due to the fact that many CPUs feature Intel’s
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instruction set extension AES-NI, which improves performance for this algorithm.
_e mode of encryption for E must be Galois Counter Mode (GCM) For a detailed
description of why this mode was chosen, see section section 5.3.2. _e inputs for an Au-
thenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) block cipher mode, such as GCM
are the following, with their names as used in SessionArmor:
k = Server Secret (the key)
iv = Cryptographically random nonce generated for each session
m = Session ID ∣ Kh ∣ Session Expiration Time (the plaintext)
a = h ∣ ah ∣ eah (authenticated data)
_e iv should be 96-bits as recommended by the GCM spec [34]. A long-standing
criticism of GCM is that the authentication mechanism is broken entirely if an attacker
can observe any ciphertext for which the same nonce and IV have been used twice. [28]
_erefore it is critical that the nonce be unique for every SessionArmor session and in-
clude epoch time as a component. _e “authenticated data” for AESGCM are the protocol
parameters, concatenated in their raw binary form, which are available to the server with
each request. _is ensures that an attacker has not tampered with the set of headers that
will be authenticated, or theHMAC bitmask. _is is an anti denial-of-servicemechanism
of the protocol, as modifying these parameters would simply cause the server’s HMAC
validation to fail.
_e value of tag is an auxiliary block of data produced by GCM, it authenticates that
the plaintext, m, and authenticated data, a, were encrypted with knowledge of the secret,
k, which prevents a chosen ciphertext attack. It is 128 bits, and must be sent to the client
so that the server can decrypt s on subsequent requests with authentication.
_e key used for E is “Server Secret” a shared secret among all servers, which must
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be rotated so that it is always less than 30 days old. Transitions are handled by trying the
second-most-recent key if initial decryption fails.
_e value of Kh is the HMAC key to be used by the client. It is chosen in a crypto-
graphically random fashion by the server for each client session.
_e value of ‘Session Expiration Time’ is the ûnal second for which the session is valid
in Unix epoch time. Sessions must not last longer than 30 days.
_e value of h is theHMAC algorithm chosen by the server, it uses the same bit vector
format and length sent by the client, butwith only one of the bits set to 1, to indicate the
chosen HMAC algorithm.
_e key ah stands for “Authenticated Headers”. _is is a bit vector using the same
dynamic length format that’s used for the HMAC algorithm selection. A bit being high
in this bit vector indicates that a certain header should be authenticated. _e list of au-
thenticatable headers are part of this standard and can be read in order, with descriptions,
as part of the reference implementation in Appendix Appendix A.1. _e masks are gen-
erated dynamically from this order via bit-shiing with the declaration of the variable
AUTH HEADER MASKS seen there. _e ûrst bit of this mask indicates whether or not the
server is choosing to use nonce-based replay prevention, note that this ûeld must be in-
cluded in this bitmask to prevent denial of service: an attacker could attach a nonce to a
request not using nonce-based-replay prevention. If so, there would be no other means to
determine whether or not the nonce should be included in theHMAC computation.
_e key eah stands for “Extra AuthenticatedHeaders”; it is a list of customheaders that
should be authenticated, as required by the web application. For example, the header X-
Content-Type-Options ispopular forprotecting againstMIME typemodiûcation. [43]
_e strings are the full, hyphenated, names of the headers to be authenticated, delimited
by commas with no surrounding whitespace.
_e ah and eah values can be thought of as the “expectation” feature of SessionArmor.
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_is feature allows the server to indicate which ûelds in the request should be authenti-
cated. Ideally, the entire request, headers and body, would be authenticated by the client.
However, this is not always practical, or possible. For example, in previous session pro-
tection protocols, it was recognized that certain header ûelds were not accessible to client
implementation frameworks such as browser Add-On APIs. _is led to a reduction in in-
tegrity checking. For example, in the reference implementation ofOTC [14], the only ûeld
authenticated was the path string. Because SessionArmor authenticates the set of chosen
headers using AEAD encryption, it strengthens the authentication of client requests.
_e primary reason that both standard and non-standardHTTP headers must be con-
ûgurable for an ideal HTTP HMAC aremiddle-boxes. We wish the client to authenticate
all request data towhich it has access at the time of request. However, some request headers
will bemodiûed or appended by proxies and load-balancers, thus rendering them unable
to be authenticated. _ese headers include Accept Encoding:, X-Forwarded-For,
and Via:. [40] Once the headers are altered, we need amechanism by which we can de-
terminewhat headers the clientwas actually able to authenticate at the time of the request.
We therefore assume that the web application is aware of a minimal set of headers that
will not be touched by middle-boxes. A demonstration of this issue can be seen in ûgure
ûg. 5.2.
_e value of n is the nonce for counter-based replay prevention. It is optional and
should be chosen in a cryptographically random fashion by the server. Note that either eah
or n or both can be omitted without aòecting client parsing of this initialization response.
Note that the global protocol options can be changed on the y for new sessions, be-
cause the protocol is stateless. Sessions established using old settings will continue to
present those options to the server until the session expires. _is implies that if nonce-
based replay prevention is used, and it is subsequently disabled, the nonce-cache must
remain accessible for one period of themaximum session lifetime.
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Figure 5.2: Proxies maymodify or append to the headers of a client request
Shown in ûg. 5.3 is an example of the server header for the establishment of a new
session. First, the un-encoded header is shown with hexadecimal and binary notation as
appropriate, then, the actual encoded header is shown, with base64 notation.
Mode of Encryption for the Block Cipher
_emode of operation for the cipher Emust not be Electronic Code Book, ECBmode,
as was suggested by Session Lock [2]. _e reason for this is the nature of of the data be-
ing encrypted, namely the Session ID concatenated with the HMAC key. Session IDs are
sometimes insecurely chosen by web frameworks to be sequential and monotonically in-
creasing. SessionArmor prevents against this weakness by encrypting the SessionID with
the use of an IV. If such an incrementing Session ID were to exceed the block size of AES,
16 bytes,which is likely, then the ûrst block of every opaque tokenwould be identical for all
clients for a given period (duringwhich themore-signiûcant bits of the Session ID remain
static). ECB would create a situation in which many encrypted blocks are identical, and













Figure 5.3: Server header for the establishment of a new session in un-encoded and base64
notation
A popular alternative mode of operation is Cipher Block Chaining, CBC mode. _is
mode uses an initialization vector, and results in all identical plaintext blocks being en-
crypted to diòerent ciphertext blocks, as long as a truly random IV is chosen for each use
of the cipher. CBC mode has a number of drawbacks, one of which is performance. Ci-
phertext blocks are fed-back into each use of the block cipher, so encryption cannot be
parallelized.
_e most critical drawback of CBC mode is that it requires the message plaintext to
be padded to the block size. Padding can’t be avoided because the plaintext is used as
direct input to the block cipher. _is padding means that CBC mode is susceptible to
a type of chosen ciphertext attack called a padding oracle attack [39], the most famous
of which is POODLE against SSLv3 [37]. It is carried out by iterating over byte-by-byte
modiûcation of the ciphertext, in reverse, to determine the plaintext. It uses the server as an
“oracle”which signals to the attackerwhen the padding of themutated plaintext is correct.
Once the mutated plaintext has correct padding, the original intermediate ciphertext can
be determined by XORing the mutated plaintext with the mutated ciphertext. With the
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original intermediate ciphertext, the original plaintext can be determined by XORing the
original ciphertext with the original intermediate ciphertext.
_ere are two factors at play which make this possible. One, is that single-bytemodi-
ûcations of the ciphertext result in single-byte modiûcations of the plaintext in a speciûc
block. _e second is that the oracle can detect this and may send back diòerent error
messages in each case. _is attack is mitigated by the server sending back a generic error
message, rather than distinct “Error” and “Padding Incorrect” messages. However, the fast
failure of an “incorrect padding” casemay still reveal this information, such that a timing
attack is still possible. Another mitigation is the inclusion of a ciphertext MAC, to prevent
any chosen ciphertext attack. However, even the veriûcation of theMAC for the un-padded
ciphertext can reveal the padding via timing analysis, this is the Lucky _irteen attack on
TLS. [3]
_is rules out CBC mode for Session Armor because it is especially susceptible to a
timing-based oracle attack. _e diòerence between a successful decryption and an un-
successful decryption in Session Armor is the diòerence between a valid Session ID that
results in a database or cache query, and an invalid Session ID that results in an unauthen-
ticatedHTTP response which can be immediately sent to the client. With a successful but
invalid decryption,which is the “probe” of the padding oracle attack, the timing diòerence
would be ampliûed by this database or cache query, which cannot be made in a constant
time consistent with theHTTP error response.
Amode that is not susceptible to padding oracle attacks and does not suòer from per-
formance drawbacks is counter, CTR, mode. Padding of the input message is not needed
because in CTR mode the only input to the block cipher is a monotonically increasing
counter. _is essentially turns the block cipher into a stream cipher, which is XORed with
the plaintext to produce the ciphertext.
CTRmode performswell, and is secure against diòerential and statistical cryptanalysis
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as long as a unique counter is chosen for each use. However, CTR mode is still not ideal, as
discussed in [22]. Amajor drawback is that it does not provide cryptographic integrity, i.e.
veriûcation to the server that the encrypted message was one originally encrypted using
the secret key. _is means that in order to prevent an attacker from performing chosen
ciphertext attacks, CTR mode must be used with a MAC of the ciphertext itself. In Ses-
sion Armor’s case, where the data being encrypted is itself an HMAC key, the overhead of
supplying this “ciphertext MAC” in both directions approaches 50%, so it is not the best
choice.
Modes of encryption that additionally provide integrity veriûcation are called “Authen-
ticated Encryption” modes. Six such modes have been standardized by ISO. For a number
of reasons, one of them reigns supreme in current practice. GaloisCounter Mode,GCM is
the standard AEmode in IEEE 802.1AE, next generation Ethernet security, IEEE 802.11ad,
next generationWiFi security, FC-SP, the FibreChannel SecurityProtocol, IPSec, SSH, and
TLS 1.2 [42]. GCM performswell, as both encryption and decryption can be performed in
parallel, it does not require padding of the plaintext message, it provides message integrity,
and Intel has dedicated an instruction to one of itsmost costly operations, PCLMULQDQ,
which has been implemented since 2010 in x86 designs from all major vendors. Also, ac-
cording to the authors of [34], GCM is not patent-encumbered.
In addition to these excellent properties, GCM, allows for the authentication of “ex-
tra” data sent in the clear, which makes it an AEADmode, Authenticated Encryption with
Associated Data. _is is especially useful to Session Armor, because there is parametric
data included with each request from the client that can and should be authenticated by
the server, namely, the HMAC algorithm that has been chosen for the session, h, the au-
thenticated HMAC header ûeld bitmask, ah, and the extra authenticated headers, eah.
Authenticating these values as associated data using the block cipher mode of encryption
is a boon to the integrity of Session Armor against protocol downgrade attacks. _ese
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would otherwise be protected only by theHMAC computed by the client. Without server-
side integrity, an attackerwould be able to forge an HMAC for a downgraded set of header
ûelds if theHMAC key was obtained.
5.4 Session Phase
5.4.1 Client Session Phase
When a client receives the TLS protected X-S-Armor header from the server, it de-
codes and stores the parameters for the session.
When any data is stored by the client for the purposes of a Session Armor session, it
is keyed by the fully qualiûed domain name of the server that sent the response. _us,
unlike cookies, a subdomain may not store a Session Armor token for a parent domain.
_is prevents the “Cookie Stuõng” vulnerability, in which a rouge subdomain overwrites
cookies for a parent domain in a malicious fashion. In doing so this enables a variant of
the Session Fixation attack, and other more benign issues related to cookie overwriting, all
of which aremitigated by Session Armor.
It is recommended that built-in language support is used for storing and decoding bit-
vectors, as many CPU architectures feature an instruction that can be used for quickly
ûnding themost-signiûcant set bit in a word.
_e values of s, IV, and tag are each components of the opaque token containing the
encrypted Session ID. _ey are stored by the client without modiûcation. Kh is also stored
without modiûcation.
_e value of h, the bitmask indicating which HMAC algorithm will be used for the
session, is stored without modiûcation, and may also be stored in another form such as a
string or function reference. _e requirement is that this value can be used by the client
to quickly determinewhich HMAC algorithm to use for authenticating requests to a given
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domain.
_e values of ah, and eah are the bitmasks indicating which request ûelds are to be
authenticated, and are stored without modiûcation. _ey may also be stored in an un-
packed fashion. _e strings contained in eah are stored unmodiûed as the unpacked form
of eah. _e requirement here is that the client can quickly determinewhich ûelds must be
authenticated by theHMAC.
If the ûrst bit of ah is 1 and n c is not present, or if n c is present and the ûrst bit of ah
is 0, then an error is thrown and the session data for this domain is discarded. _is should
be silent to the user, who is prompted by the server to authenticate again upon subsequent
requests. Recall that these setup actions should only be performed on a secure response
with a new Session ID from the server, to prevent denial of service attacks against the client.
If n c is present, then the ûrst bit of ah is checked. If it is 1, indicating that nonce-
based replay preventions is to be used, then n c is stored in a way that allows it to be easily
retrieved and incremented on subsequent requests.
Client authentication of requests
For each request, the client computes the followingHMAC.Example input to theHMAC,
with output, can be seen in ûg. 5.4.
c : HMAC(Kh, [n] | "+" |
t | lt |
ah_val0 | [ah_val1 | ah_val2 ...] |
eah_val0[, eah_val1, eah_val2 ...] |
path |
request body OR "")
_e value of n is the current value of the nonce counter, included if the ûrst bit of ah
for this session is 1.
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HMAC(0x3283416f2060c83f154ea762b20559ef,2736056|+|15057731
23|1505773123|127.0.0.1|Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac








Figure 5.4: ExampleHMAC input and output,withkey and output encoded in hexadecimal
notation. SHA-512 is in use
_e “+” between n and the rest of the parameters is the single character ‘+’. It is always
included. _is is used to distinguish the nonce from the request expiration timestamp in
the server-side implementation. _at is,when absolute replay prevention is not being used,
the string being authenticated begins with ‘+’.
_e value of t is the request expiration timestamp in Unix epoch time. It is the ûnal
second for which the request is valid. _e recommended value is 4 minutes aer the re-
quest time given the expected time-to-live ofTCP traõc. _e value of lt is theUnix epoch
timestamp of the time at which the last request was sent. It is used by the server to deter-
mine if the session should be invalidated due to inactivity. It is included in the HMAC so
that a man-in-the-middle cannot invalidate the session by setting lt to a value far in the
past.
_e value of h is the HMAC algorithm bitmask, with the chosen bit set. _e value of
ah val0 ∣ [ah val1 ∣ ah val2 ...] are the values of the headers to be authenticated
in the order of the ah bitmask.
_e value of eah val0[, eah val1, eah val2 ...] are the extra headers to be
authenticated, as comma separated strings, in the order of the strings included in eah.
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_e value of path is the value of the HTTP path being requested, e.g. / or /user-
s/list?sort=lastname. It is always included. _e value of request body is the full
body of the request. For example, if the requestwas a POST request and included post data,
this would be the full post data beginning at the ûrst byte aer the <CR><LF><CR><LF>
sequence following the last HTTP header.
Aer computing theHMAC, n c is incremented by 1. _e client then sends the follow-
ing data to the server in an X-S-Armor header. An example of this header can be seen in
encoded and un-encoded form in ûg. 5.5, with ûelds encoded in hexadecimal and binary
as appropriate.
c: Client HMAC result
t: The time of the request
lt: Last request time
iv: Initialization vector
tag: AEAD tag
h: Chosen HMAC algo bitmask
ah: Authenticated headers bitmask
eah: List of extra headers to authenticate
(optional) [n]: Nonce value for replay prevention
5.4.2 Server Session Phase
When the server receives a client request that includes the c key in the Session Armor
header, the server knows that the request is for an already established session rather than
a new session. At this point, the server must validate the request.
First s is decrypted using the server secret, k, along with the IV and tag provided
in the client header. During GCM mode decryption, the tag is used to authenticate s
automatically. _is provides the serverwith three things: an HMAC key, a Session ID, and














Figure 5.5: Client header for one request in un-encoded and base64 notation
_e value of t, the Session Expiration Time, is immediately compared against the cur-
rent time to determine if the session has expired. If it has, the request should continue
to be processed by the application with no Session ID attached. _is treats the request as
unauthenticated for the given endpoint. _e response must include the Session Armor
invalidation token as described in section section 5.5.
When performing session invalidation in thisway, itmay seemnecessary to recompute
session expiry (and necessarily recompute the HMAC in order to validate the values of t
and th) as part of a hook at response time in addition to when it was computed at request
time. _is would be the case if requests are not mutable or some other request-speciûc
auxiliary storagemechanism is not available, and a hit to performancewould result. How-
ever, a good solution is to mark the request as expired by adding the header X-S-Armor-
Invalidate. _e response hook can check for this header and invalidate the session.
Note well that this X-S-Armor-Invalidate header is meaningless to the client! Sec-
tion section 5.5 describes anHMAC procedure for invalidation of the session that prevents
denial of service.
65
Next, it is important that the server authenticate the remaining header values before
proceeding to use them. By using h, ah, eah, and the request headers and body the server
reconstructs the input to the HMAC. _e server has decrypted Kh, the HMAC key, and
uses the algorithm indicated by h. _e request is only accepted as valid if the client’s value
cmatches exactly the result of theHMAC computation. _is simultaneously validates the
request data, the request’s expiration time, and the value of the nonce counter. If the value
of c does not match, the request is rejected.
Rejecting the request means that the server returns a 403 response or redirects the
request to the login page, whichever behavior the web application would have employed
with an invalidCookie-based session. _e servermust not invalidate the session. A request
may be rejected for a number of reasons, not all ofwhich require that the server discard the
investment in the setup phase. For example, in especially congested network conditions, a
request might be receivedmore than four minutes aer it was sent, resulting in an expired
request being received by the server for innocuous reasons.
Once t and lt have known good values, they are used by the server to determine if the
session should be expired due to inactivity. _is is a way to perform an inactivity timeout
with no server-side state,made possible by the fact that the client can authenticate any data
for use by the server, including its last request time. _is feature is depicted in ûg. 5.6
Next, the session expiration time, t, is compared against the current time to determine
if the request has expired. _is is “time-based replay prevention”. If n is present, then
the server performs the following operations for “nonce-based replay prevention”. _is
is absolute replay prevention. First, we describe some prerequisites. _e server uses a
persistent storagemedium to retrieve themost recently seen nonce. _is medium should
be keyed by the Session ID and shared by all servers. A good place to store these values
might be a shared cachewith a cache timeout conûgurable to inûnity. Abitmask indicating
all recently seennonces should also be stored per Session ID._ese are nr and nb, the recent
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Figure 5.6: HMAC of last-request-time enables a stateless inactivity timeout
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nonce and the nonce bitmask. It is recommended that the bit-length of nb be theword size
of the server’s CPU for optimal performance, and it must be at least 32 bits. _is allows for
up to 32 in-ight requests from the same session, and 64 or more if a larger bit-vector is
used. _e following procedure is used to determine if a nonce should be accepted. Each of
these cases is illustrated in ûg. 5.7.
1. nr and nb are retrieved from the storagemedium.
2. _e client’s nonce is now evaluated,whichwe now call nc. First, nr −nc is computed.
If it is greater than length(nb) then the nonce is too old. It has “fallen oò the end”
of the bitmask, and the request is immediately rejected.
3. If it is greater than or equal to 0, then the bitmask is checked to determine if the
nonce has been seen before, by shiing an LSB to the le by nr − nc and performing
a bitwise-and. If the target bit is set to 0, then the request proceeds with a response
and that bit is set to 1 in nb. If the bit is set to 1, then the request is rejected as a
repeated request.
4. If it is less than 0, this means that nc is the most recently seen nonce. nr is set to
nc and nb is shied by this oòset so that the ûrst bit would correspond to nr. _e
request proceeds with a response.
_e _e bitmask nb is being used here as a compact storage mechanism the most re-
cently seen nonces. If a request is ever rejected by nonce replay, it is important to delete
the stored values of nr and nb so that they are not incorrectly used to reject requests when
a new session is established.
A valid request means that the server attaches the Session ID in the request’s Cookie:
header, using the Session ID cookie name expected by the web application. _is cookie is
set only on the server backend for the purposes of identifying the client using the existing
68






Figure 5.8: Invalidation header ûrst showing parameters and then HMAC result.
session management and permissions system. A corresponding Set Cookie: header
must not be sent to the client.
5.5 Session Invalidation Phase
Only the server knows the expiration time of the session. It’s contained in the opaque
token. _is is to prevent the “Session Extension” attack mentioned in section section 1.4.
When a session has expired, the server sends the following X-S-Armor header data to the
client to invalidate the session. It uses the HMAC algorithm chosen for that session. An
example header, ûrst shown with the parameters and then with the resulting HMAC can
be seen in ûgure ûg. 5.8. SHA-512 is in use.
i:base64(HMAC(Kh, "Session Expired"))
When the client receives these values it performs the HMAC using the secret HMAC
key which it has stored for this domain. If it validates, then the client deletes all Session
Armor data that it has stored for this domain. If it has no Kh for this domain, then the
message is ignored. _is “invalidation validation” is to prevent denial of service on the
client by aman-in-the-middle sending this invalidation header ûeld.
With this invalidation phase, all possible message types in SessionArmor have been
presented. A diagram which summarizes the protocol can be seen in ûgure ûg. 5.9.
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Figure 5.9: Example run of the SessionArmor protocol
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5.6 On theUse ofHMAC-SHA3
_e authors of the SHA-3 algorithm, Keccak, believe that HMAC-SHA3 would not re-
quire the “ipad-and-opad” scheme of the generalized HMAC, because unlike SHA-1 and
SHA-2, Keccak does not have a length-extension weakness. Instead, MAC computation
can be performed by simply prepending the message with a key. [9] NIST has recently
presented a standard for using Keccak in an authentication context, a “KMAC”, [29]which
has not been widely adopted. _e predominant Python implementation of SHA3 warns
against using it for the purposes of constructing an HMAC.
In addition, whenever an HMAC algorithm is widely deployed and in use, test vectors
for the algorithmwill be readily available from trusted sources. _ese test vectors arewell-
known input and output pairs than can be used to test an implementation of the algorithm.
For example, test vectors for HMAC SHA-256 can be found in RFC 4231 [38]. _ere are no
such widely distributed test vectors for HMAC-SHA3. HMAC-SHA256 is also considered
secure at this time, and there is no pressing need for another cryptographic hash-based
authentication system with similar characteristics.
72
6. Formal Veriûcation of the Session Armor Protocol
Formal veriûcation creates a link from the mathematics that have been developed for
notions of secrecy and authentication— to the dailyuse of cryptography and cryptographic
protocols. Perhaps the most widely used cryptographic protocol, SSL (now TLS), which
underlies https:// connections has undergone much scrutiny over the years, as aws
are found and new versions are released. Formal veriûcation of TLS [10] and its under-
lying cryptographic primitives [5] is an area of research that has received much attention
in recent years. Newly developed cryptographic protocols, such as Session Armor, can be
veriûed using formal methods to provide the credential of being provably secure under the
abstractions of a given model.
In the literature, there are two abstract models of cryptography that have been used to
develop proof-checking systems. One, called the computational model treats messages as
bitstrings. _ese messages represent what might be plaintext, ciphertext, or control mes-
sages. In this model, functions are deûned with precise operations on bitstrings that pro-
duce bitstrings as output. One notable example of a veriûcation system using the compu-
tation model is the Veriûed Soware Toolchain [4] which combines a static analyzer for a
subset of the C language called Veriûable C with a veriûed C compiler from INRIA called
CompCert. _is was the toolchain used to create a veriûed implementation of SHA-256 in
[5].
_e alternative basis for cryptographic veriûcation is known as the symbolic model,
which has a more abstract perspective on functions and data. Cryptographic functions
are modeled as perfect black-boxes, and messages are terms that exist in an algebra with
these functions, including equations. An adversary can compute only with these primi-
tives. _is model was ûrst presented by Dolev and Yao [16], and so is commonly referred
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to as the Dolev-Yao model. _is model was used by Lowe [33] to present a man-in-the-
middle attack on the Needham and Schroeder public key protocol, 17 years aer it was
introduced.
ProVerif is a protocol veriûcation system that operates in the Dolev-Yao model, and is
the system that we use to verify Session Armor. It deûnes a functional modeling language
whose equations can be characterized as operating in the applied pi-calculus. _is is an ex-
tension to pi-calculus, or “process” calculus, speciûcally designed formodeling the domain
of cryptographic protocols. Process calculus deûnes a grammar that speciûes notions of
inûnite repetition and simultaneous execution. For example, here is an excerpt from the





( !(browser(user_id, password)) | !(webapp(server_secret)) )
_e ! speciûes inûnite repetition and the ∣ speciûes simultaneous execution. So, any
properties proven by this veriûcation will be for inûnite simultaneous executions of any
possible user credentials and server secret. _e extended grammar provided by Proverif
include free variables, channels, functions, and events. Both free variables and channels
can be deûned as being public, available to an attacker, or private, unavailable to an at-
tacker. _us, the way wemodel HTTPS is simply as a private channel, a sequence point in
a process atwhichmessages might be observed. Two examples of functions are symmetric
encryption andHMAC, which are deûned as symbolic equations as follows:
(* Symmetric Encryption *)
fun encrypt(bitstring, key): bitstring.
reduc forall plaintext: bitstring, k: key;
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decrypt(encrypt(plaintext, k), k) = plaintext.
(* Message Authentication *)
fun hmac(bitstring, key): bitstring.
ProVerif translatesprocesses into algebraic expressionsonmessages usingqueries spec-
iûed by the user. _ese queries are requests by the user to evaluate one of four security
properties. [11]
• Secrecy, expressed as “Reachability”
• Authentication, expressed as “Correspondence”
• Strong Secrecy, expressed as “Observational Equivalence”
_e properties tested for SessionArmor were secrecy of both session secrets and
server secrets and injective correspondence of client requests with server responses.
_ese expressions are translated by ProVerif into Horn-clauses, Boolean expressions of
the form:
p ∧ q ∧⋯ ∧ t → u (6.1)
_ese Boolean expressions, ûrst-order implications, are then checked using satisûabil-
ity techniques. [11]When the number of executions of the protocol is unbounded, as is the
case with ProVerif, the problem lies beyond the computational domain of NP-complete,
and is undecidable, as was shown by [17]. _is means that ProVerif will sometimes termi-
natewith a inconclusive result. As a user of the system, one such situation iswhen ProVerif
can negate the Horn-clauses, but cannot terminate at the stage in which this negation is
translated back to an actual process for performing the attack (called a “derivation”).
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Timewas spentwith this type of no-derivation output for SessionArmor,with attempts
to model sequential nonces using ProVerif ’s persistence features. Because these results re-
sulted in non-termination of the derivation phase, SessionArmor was eventuallymodeled
as a single iteration with an arbitrary nonce. Under this model, both secrecy and authen-
tication were veriûed. _e full model and ProVerif output can be found in Appendix C.
6.1 Proof of SecrecyUsing ProVerif
Secrecy queries in ProVerif operate on free variables. _e usage pattern is to declare a
private free variable, use the variable in a processmacro, and include a reachability query to
determine if the attacker can observe the private variable in a process replication. Notated,
this looks like the following:






Onemight see that the free variables are not the target data being tested for reachability,
but rather a proxy for testing the reachability of server secret and session secret.
Because the target secrets are declared as newly generated within each replication of the
process, they cannot be declared as free variables. So, we test instead if an attacker could
discover them as keys for encrypting server secret test and session secret test
with an ideal symmetric cipher. Both server secrets and session secrets were found to be
unreachable by an attacker.
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6.2 Proof of Authentication Using ProVerif
Authentication in ProVerif is tested using so-called correspondence queries. A corre-
spondence query veriûes that a given event, with speciûc associated data is executed only
after another event with the same associated data. _is property represents authentica-
tion if the second event occurs in a simultaneously executing process; in this case repre-
senting a server actor in a client-server relationship. _is stems from the concept of the
event occurring just before some privileged action. _is type of veriûcation ensures that
the action could not take place without ûrst having been authorized by a client holding
secret data. Notated in ProVerif, this looks like the following:







event clientRequest(session_secret, request_time, request_nonce,
request_url, request_data);
out(HTTP, (request_time, request_nonce,




let (server_hmac: bitstring) =
hmac((request_time, request_nonce, request_url,request_data), session_secret) in
if request_hmac = server_hmac then
event serverResponse(session_secret, request_time, request_nonce,
request_url, request_data).
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_e typeof correspondencequeryusedhereprovides an additional guarantee known as
injective correspondence. _is constructsHorn clauses that resolve to a test of the ûrst event
occurring exactly once before the second event. Meaning that in addition to authentica-
tion, this veriûcation ensures that aman-in-the-middle would not be able to manufacture
an authentication request and subsequently expect the server to authenticate it. _us, this
validates the property of replay prevention.
78
7. Reference Implementation of Session Armor
7.1 Server Implementation as a Django Middleware
SessionArmorwas implemented as amiddleware for theDjangoweb framework. Django
middleware are Python modules that hook into the request and response processing of
HTTP requests in the context of the Django web application. By observing the state of
the X-S-Armor: header, and being able to modify it upon response, SessionArmor was
implementedwith all speciûed requirements. _e full source code for this implementation
can be found in Appendix A.1.
In support of goal 4, EasyDeployment, a number of conûguration options are provided
with sane defaults. _ese are:
• _e number of seconds for which a SessionArmor session should be valid, defaults
to 14 days.
• _e amount of time for which a request is valid, defaults to 5 minutes.
• _e amount of time between requests before a session is expired to due inactivity,
defaults to 30minutes.
• _e set of standard headers to authenticate. _e defaults are headers which are
known to be available to browser add-in mechanisms. _ese are speciûed in text
rather than in bitmask form, and translated on-the-y to a packed bitmask, only
once upon application startup.
• A ag to indicate if nonce-based replay prevention should be used
• A list of “extra authenticated headers”, two are provided as examples
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For additional convenience, thePython loggingmodule is used to set up a logger specif-
ically for Session Armor. When Django is in debugging mode, log messages indicating
any request failuremodes are logged with a Session Armor preûx. For example, if a client
HMAC fails to validate, the following log message appears.
[DEBUG] sessionarmor_django.middleware: The client’s HMAC did not validate
Nonce-based replay prevention is implemented using Django’s own caching mecha-
nism. As long as there is a cache deûned in Django’s CACHES setting with the name “ses-
sionarmor”, both the nonce values and nonce storage bitmasks for each client will be per-
sisted automatically. For the purposes of performance testing, this cache was conûgured
to use Redis as a backend, with Redis conûgured to communicate over a Unix socket and
never time-out values in its store.
One feature of the source code which may be useful to an application developer is a
commented description of all standard HTTP headers that can be used as authenticated
headers, in the order that they would appear in the packed bitmask. Lastly, the Python
cryptographymodule was used to implement AES-GCM.
7.1.1 Exceptions
A number of exceptional conditions can take place during execution of the protocol
that can cause the server to recognize that a request is invalid and respond in a certain
manner. _e following is a list of those conditions and how the server should respond.
_ese are handled using custom exception classes in the Djangomiddleware for easy refer-
ence. _e exceptions are allowed to rise to the entrypoint of themiddleware to be handled
in a centralized area of the code. Messages are provided with each exception type to indi-
cate the reason for the exception, which are logged to the SessionArmor logger when the
application is at debug level. In all of these cases except for Session Expiration the server
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responds with 403, Permission Denied, and does not allow the request to be processed as
usual.
InvalidHMAC algo mask
If a ready-state client request contains anHMAC algorithm bitmask that does not have
any bits set that match the set of supported HMAC algorithms, then it would appear that
the client supports SessionArmor, but the protocol cannot proceed.
Invalid selectedHMAC algo mask
If a client signed request contains a selected HMAC algorithm bitmask that does not
have a valid bit set for the purpose of selecting a hash module, then the bitmask has been
tampered with or is otherwise invalid for the purposes of authenticating requests with the
server.
HMAC does not validate
If the client’sHMAC does notmatch the server’sHMAC, then itmeans that the request
has been tampered-with in transit, or was otherwise truncated or modiûed in some way
not intended by the client.
Opaque token failed authenticated encryption
In addition to the per-request HMAC of Session Armor, AEAD mode encryption is
used to authenticate the ciphertext of the opaque token. _e GCM tag is provided to the
server with each request from the client. If the tag does not match the authentication code
produced at the end of decryption, then then the server assumes that some formof chosen
plaintext attack is taking place, and no attempt will bemade to validate the authenticity of
the request.
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Opaque token does not contain the required ûelds
If, aer decrypting the opaque token using the server secret, the server ûnds that it
does not contain all of the required ûelds for request authentication, then processing of the
request cannot proceed. _ese required ûelds are: Session ID,HMAC Key, and Expiration
Time.
Request expiration
If, aer validating the authenticity of the request’s HMAC, it is found that the request
is too stale, given the setting for request valid duration (5 minutes by default), then the
requestmust be rejected by the server. _is is themechanism for time-based request replay
prevention.
Nonce invalid
If nonce-based replay prevention is being used, and a client provides a nonce that has
been seen before, then the request is rejected. _e request is also rejected if the nonce is
too stale, given the storage limitation of the nonce cache. _e nonce cache for the Django
middleware implementation uses a bit vector per session of one machine-word size. On
the test machine, this is 64 bits. So, if the client provides a nonce with a value that is more
than 63 values behind the latest value seen, the request is rejected. If the nonce is recent
enough, the bit vector is tested.
Session Expiration
_ere are two conditions for session expiration: absolute expiration and inactivity time-
out. As soon as the server decrypts the opaque token, which is one of the ûrst steps of re-
quest validation, it checks the absolute expiration time for the session hiddenwithin. If the
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expiration time has passed, validation of the request is immediately aborted. On the other
hand, the inactivity timeout is checked aer the request HMAC has been validated, this is
because the request time and prior request time are values contained within the HMAC.
_e inactivity duration is computed, and if it exceeds the conûgured threshold, then the
session expired.
In both cases, the request is allowed to proceed as usual, but a Session ID is not in-
jected. _is means that the client will be presented with the response from normal appli-
cation logic (most likely a 200), but as if the request were made anonymously. In some
applications, this may immediately present the login form, which is what the user would
expect.
7.2 Client Implementation as Google Chrome Extension
_e SessionArmor client was implemented as a Google Chrome browser extension.
Extensions are soware components that operate around API hooks into the life-cycle of
of browser events, such as theHTTP request-responsemechanism. _e hooks used by Ses-
sionArmor in particular were: onBeforeRequest to store request body data for HMAC
input, onHeadersReceived to watch for opaque tokens that begin a session, and onBe-
foreSendHeaders as the primary code path to gather data about each request, perform
theHMAC, and build the components of the X-S-Armor header.
In order to obtain raw POST data, which is required by the SessionArmor protocol,
Chrome had to be modiûed. By default, the extension API provides request body data
in the form of a hash-table. _is removes the order information needed for theHMAC to
hash the request body exactly as the serverwill see it. Chrome has the ability to provide the
body as a byte buòer, but only does so if the body cannot be otherwise parsed. Amodiûed
Chromium browser was compiledmaking the byte buòer the default behavior.
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_e extension is seamless in operation for theuser. Aer installation, an icon appears in
the user’s browserwindow that indicates the current SessionArmor state for the active tab.
If there is an active SessionArmor session, the icon is badgedwith a green circle; otherwise,
it’s badged with a red circle. _at’s it! _ere’s no set-up or user interaction required for a
SessionArmor user. Full source code for the Chrome extension can be found in Appendix
A.2.
7.3 Performance Evaluation
For a complete picture of the reference implementation, both the server and clientwere
tested for overall performance characteristics. A test applicationwaswritten, a To-Do List,
usingDjango as a backend with the SessionArmor middleware installed, and accessed via
Google Chrome with the SessionArmor extension installed. A screenshot of the applica-
tion can be seen in ûgure ûg. 7.1. Two tests were conducted to address each of the targets
of goal number 3, and baseline performance of the entire HTTP processing time on the
server-side was also established.
_e ûrst test was of session setup time. Recall from goal number 3 that the target Ses-
sionArmor overhead for session setup time was set at 100ms. _is fairly lenient goal was
set as such because a credential-providing (log-in) event is rare. Users are accustomed
to this type of request taking longer than other types and perhaps including OAuth-style
redirects. (Note that SessionArmor is compatible with OAuth’s “bearer token”, which acts
as a Session ID)
_e testwas carried out by executing an XMLHttpRequest against the login endpoint
of the application in a loop in the console of the web browser. Concurrent requests were
made 32 at a time. _is number was chosen because at around 64 concurrent requests
SessionArmor’s nonce vector was observed to be overloaded; which as discussed in sec-
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Figure 7.1: To-Do application using SessionArmor live on the Internet
tion 5.4.2 is a tunable parameter, and a trade-oò between performance and storage cost.
On the server side, during this test, performance data was collected by instrumenting
the return paths of process request and process responsewhich are executed dur-
ing session creation, to each log to a ûle their total execution time. _ese times were then
summed to ûnd the server-side execution time. _e same was done on the client-side, but
for session creation this only involved the return path of a single callback function, and
instead of logging, results were appended to a value in localStorage. To evaluate per-
formance of the overall HTTP processing time, the request handler of the WSGI server
itself was instrumented. To eliminate jitter due to network interfaces, this was preferable
to measuring response times at the client. _e results can be found in table 7.1 and seen in
ûg. 7.2 through ûg. 7.4.
A few interesting conclusions can be drawn from this data. First, even the sum of the
slowest client and server processing times, 1.48ms, is well below the target of 100 ms. On
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Table 7.1: Session Creation Time Performance (ms)
Context Samples Min Median 99% Max Mean
SessionArmor Server 128 0.223 0.253 0.521 0.710 0.275
SessionArmor Client 128 0.140 0.175 0.585 0.770 0.195
HTTP Server 128 9.121 39.615 70.705 89.462 33.346
Figure 7.2: Session creation times for SessionArmor server
Figure 7.3: Session creation times for SessionArmor client
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Figure 7.4: Session creation times for HTTP-server
average, the client processing time is 80 µs faster than the server processing time. From
the histograms, we can see that most of the server and client processing happens in less
than 300 µs, while theHTTP processing time is more bi-modal, with amean of around 33
ms. _is gives us an average overhead of 1.41% for SessionArmor during session creation.
_e next test was that of SessionArmor overhead during application usage. _e server,
client, and HTTP server were instrumented as described earlier to measure their perfor-
mance. _is time, however, the processing time of two callbacks on the client-side, body
storage and header processing, needed to bemeasured and summed in a similar fashion to
the server implementation. _e test was a POST request, inserting a new To-Do list item
with a modest length of 48 characters. _e requests were made using the web browser
console in concurrent batches of 32.
To test the overhead of each security feature of SessionArmor, each was disabled suc-
cessively and the testwas re-run. First, nonce-based replay prevention, “NBRP”was turned
oò using the middleware setting. _en, header authentication was turned oò by modify-
ing the server and client code to not include it in the HMAC input. _e same was then
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Table 7.2: HTTP Server – Application Request Performance (ms)
Test Samples Min Median 99% Max Mean
Full Protocol 1024 5.597 37.04 187.052 316.021 57.908
Table 7.3: SessionArmor Server – Application Request Performance (ms)
Test Samples Min Median 99% Max Mean
Full Protocol 1024 0.605 0.93 2.992 3.97 1.055
No NBRP 1024 0.322 0.528 1.379 2.206 0.552
No Header Auth. 1024 0.253 0.398 1.211 3.153 0.436
No TBRP 1024 0.237 0.370 1.008 1.952 0.393
done for time-based replay prevention, “TBRP”. Each feature was disabled in addition to
all prior disabled features. _e results can be seen in table 7.2 through table 7.4 and ûg. 7.5
through ûg. 7.13.
Some important conclusions can be drawn from this data. First, the full protocol, in
the worst case, adds 7.04 ms overhead, below the target of 10 ms. _is is a sum of the
worst case client processing time and the worst case server processing time. On average,
SessionArmor adds 1.843 ms to each request, an overhead of 3.18%. When nonce-based
replay prevention is disabled, a suggested mode of operation for stateless operation, this
overhead drops to 1.265 ms or 2.18%. _ese tests also allow us to see the average overhead
of each feature: 578 µs for absolute replay prevention, 279 µs for header authentication,
and 155 µs for time-based replay prevention.
Table 7.4: SessionArmor Client – Application Request Performance (ms)
Test Samples Min Median 99% Max Mean
Full Protocol 1024 0.455 0.74 1.832 3.07 0.788
No NBRP 1024 0.400 0.685 1.51 2.205 0.713
No Header Auth. 1024 0.335 0.545 1.334 2.400 0.550
No TBRP 1024 0.260 0.420 0.947 1.300 0.438
88
Figure 7.5: Application performance for HTTP Server
Figure 7.6: Application performance for SessionArmor server, full protocol
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Figure 7.7: Application performance for SessionArmor server, no NBRP
Figure 7.8: Application performance for SessionArmor server, no Header Auth.
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Figure 7.9: Application performance for SessionArmor server, no TBRP
Figure 7.10: Application performance for SessionArmor client, full protocol
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Figure 7.11: Application performance for SessionArmor client, no NBRP
Figure 7.12: Application performance for SessionArmor client, no Header Auth.
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Figure 7.13: Application performance for SessionArmor client, no TBRP
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8. Conclusions
_ere is a mounting trend for nearly all soware to use the web as a platform. Even
“heavy-liing” tasks such as document creation, video editing, and 3D-modeling now ûnd
their home in a web browser. Government functions, such a tax return acceptance and
health care distribution now famously use the web. It would seem paramount that we de-
velop means to protect all users of these systems from leakage of sensitive information.
Unfortunately, the predominant means of authenticating users requests is with bearer to-
kens stored in HTTP Cookies.
_ese tokens can be obtained through a number of means, and then used to perform
unlimited privileged actions on behalf of the user. _is is known as the Session Hijacking
attack. We presented ûve means of performing Session Hijacking: Session Sidejacking,
Cross-Site Scripting, Session Fixation,Rouge BrowserExtensions, and physical access. _e
Session Extension attack was also presented ameans to increase the likelihood of a bearer
token being obtained by amalicious party.
_ere are two common means to protect session tokens from exûltration, a ag which
prevents access to the token via JavaScript, and aagwhichprevents sending the tokenover
unencrypted HTTP. Any web application which takes security matters seriously should
have these two ags enabled. To observe the use of these protections in the wild, two tools
were written. One called SessionJack, analyzed extracted cookie data for potential vul-
nerability and also session lifetime. Vulnerable cookies were manually loaded into a web
browser to verify that they enabled session access. _e second tool JackHammer, was cre-
ated for more quickly performing this test by shuøing tokens between two web browsers
using two newly created browser extensions and a websocket server.
Of 108 sites tested, over 30% le themselves open to Cross-Site Scripting, over 50% to
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Session Sidejacking, and 100% to Bearer Token Extraction. _e sites vulnerable to XSS
included some very popularwebsites according toAlexa rankings, including major banks,
business services, and e-commerce websites. _e same trend was seen for Session Side-
jacking. As far as session lifetime, there was no correlation with the protections enabled
or popularity rank, which led to the conclusion that this important parameter does not
receive enough consideration.
Existing standards for session token protectionwere also presented, these included the
HTTPOnly ag, the Secure ag, Expiration Time, HSTS, and HTTP Digest Authentica-
tion, the last of which is surprisingly an HTTP standard HMAC protocol, alternative to
Cookies, which is unfortunately oen overlooked simply for user-interface reasons. Seven
existing proposals for the protection of web sessions were presented: Fu et al.’s protocol,
Liu et al.’s protocol, SessionLock,WebKey,HTTPI,One Time Cookies, and SecSess. Some
of the concepts in these protocolswould not ûnd theirway into the new protocol presented
in this work, e.g. using the URI fragment identiûer to “pass along” a sensitive token from
page to pagewas simply too susceptible toCross-Site Scripting attacks. Also, some of these
protocols donot include per-request authentication,whichmakes them entirely vulnerable
to request replay. However, a few ideas were borrowed, such as individual request HMAC
and its ability to enable time-based replay prevention.
_e primary contribution of this work is SessionArmor, a new protocol for protecting
user sessions in web applications from being hijacked bymalicious parties. SessionArmor
accomplishes this using a per-requestHMAC,with a secret key transmitted viaTLS during
a setup phase. SessionArmor provides both time-based and nonce-based replay preven-
tion,making absolute replay prevention possible. It authenticates requests individually, so
that no request data can bemodiûed by an attacker, even on an unencrypted channel. To
accomplish this goal, it oòers conûguration of standard and non-standard header data to
be authenticated by the server in a stateless manner.
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SessionArmor has a number of additional practical features that set it apart from pre-
viouswork. It allows the theHMAC algorithm to be conûgured at the start of each session,
to future proof the protocol against cryptographicweakness. All conûguration is sentwith
each request in the form of a bit vector to save bandwidth. SessionArmor speciûes amax-
imum session lifetime and a means for stateless inactivity timeout, to prevent long-lived
secrets and eliminate the risk of Session Extension. To entirely prevent Session Fixation,
a requirement of the protocol is that new session credentials are created upon secret gen-
eration. To limit the overhead of implementing nonce-based replay prevention, nonce
storage is speciûed as being compressed in a bit-vector, with a shiing algorithm used to
validate to uniqueness of a nonce that appears with a new request. SessionArmor has also
been careful to prevent the use of less-modern modes of symmetric encryption, including
ECB, CTR, andCBC. It requires the Authenticated EncryptionwithAssociatedDatamode
GCM, which allows the origin of the server-originated secret and conûguration data to be
authenticated during decryption.
An implementation of the server was included as a Python Django middleware, and
and implementation of the client was included as a Google Chrome extension, both with
documented source code. Google Chrome had to bemodiûed to fully support the proto-
col, in order to process unmodiûed request body data at at request time. Both are complete
implementations of the protocol, including developer-oriented features such as: conûgu-
ration options with sane defaults, logging with preûxing, and self-documenting exception
handling. _e client includes aminimal user interface and zero-conûguration setup.
Both implementations were performance-tested for session creation time and applica-
tion request performance. In both cases, the performance vastly exceeded expectations.
For session creation time, most of the server and client processing happens in less than
300 µs, with an average overhead of 1.41%. For application requests, most of the server
and client processing happens in less than 1 ms, with an average overhead of 3.18%. When
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nonce-based replay prevention is disabled this overhead drops to 1.265 ms or 2.18%. _e
tests also allowed us to see the average overhead of each feature: 578 µs for absolute replay
prevention, 279 µs for header authentication, and 155 µs for time-based replay prevention.
Session Armor was formally veriûed using the ProVerif protocol veriûcation system.
ProVerif implements the symbolic model of cryptographic veriûcation using the Dolev-
Yao abstractions of a hostile communication environment. Cryptographic primitives such
as HMAC and symmetric encryption were implemented in a functional style. Additional
primitives provided by themodel checker include free and private channels, and the notion
of simultaneous execution and inûnite repetition. Queries for formal notions of secrecy and
injective correspondence were used to prove that SessionArmor is resistant to man-in-the-
middle attacks and request replay.
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Appendix A. Session Armor
A.1 Server Reference Implementation, Django Middleware Source Code
’’’
Session Armor Protocol, Django Middleware Implementation
Copyright (C) 2015 - 2016 Andrew Sauber
This software is licensed under the AGPLv3 open source license. See
LICENSE.txt. The license can also be found at the following URL, please note
the above copyright notice. https://www.gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.en.html
























# Must have a persistent Django cache named "sessionarmor" configured for the
# nonce-based replay feature to work.
# "Persistent" means that the cache is configured as follows:
# * TIMEOUT is set to None
# * MAX_ENTRIES is set larger than your max active sessions (maybe millions)
# * CULL_FREQUENCY is set to float(’inf’) or culling is disabled









from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidTag








from django.conf import settings
from django.contrib.sessions.exceptions import InvalidSessionKey
from django.core.cache import caches
from django.core.exceptions import PermissionDenied
COUNTER_BITS = 128
RECIEPT_VECTOR_BITS = 64
# All 1s followed by one 0
# Meaning: The first nonce hasn’t been seen yet, but don’t allow any
# lower-numbered invalid nonces.
INITIAL_RECIEPT_VECTOR = ((2 ** RECIEPT_VECTOR_BITS) - 2)




# these hashing algorithms are in order of preference
(1 << 2, hashlib.sha512),
(1 << 1, hashlib.sha384),
(1 << 0, hashlib.sha256),






assert len(settings.SECRET_KEY) >= 32, \
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"Django settings.SECRET_KEY must be at least {} bytes".format(32)












# Hostname to which the client is sending the request
’Host’,
# String indicating the software and/or hardware platform used to generate
# the request
’User-Agent’,
# Types of media that the client would accept in a response
’Accept’,
# Desired behavior of the connection with the first remote machine
’Connection’,
# Character encodings that the client would accept in a response
’Accept-Encoding’,
# Human languages that the client would accept in a response
’Accept-Language’,
# URI that caused or enabled the client to make the request
’Referer’,
# Persistent general-purpose tokens that the client provides to the server
’Cookie’,
# Character sets that the client would accept in a response
’Accept-Charset’,
# The last modified time known by the client, response requested if
# modified
’If-Modified-Since’,
# An entity tag. A response is requested if the entity does not match.
’If-None-Match’,
# Specifies a portion of the resource being requested
100
’Range’,
# Time at which a request was sent that includes body data
’Date’,
# Authentication credentials provided by the client for Basic or Digest
# HTTP Authentication
’Authorization’,
# An indication of how the request should be treated by caching proxies
’Cache-Control’,
# A list of origins that caused the request, e.g. used by a client script
# that has established allowable cross-origin methods via CORS
’Origin’,
# General-purpose header field, most often used with "no-cache" to request
# a non-cached version of a resource
’Pragma’,
# Boolean indicating that the user wishes not to be tracked by the server
’DNT’,
# Nonce sent by the server to be used for Cross Site Request Forgery
# protection
’X-Csrf-Token’,
# Version of the WebSocket protocol being used
’Sec-WebSocket-Version’,
# Used with websocket handshake to indicate what application level
# protocols the client wishes to use
’Sec-WebSocket-Protocol’,
# Randomly generated nonce used during the Websocket handshake
’Sec-WebSocket-Key’,
# A list of registered websocket extended features that the client wishes
# to use with a websocket connection
’Sec-WebSocket-Extensions’,
# Transfer Encodings that the user agent will accept, e.g. "deflate". Can
# also specify that "trailers" should be used for chunked transfers
’TE’,
# Mechanism used to make the request, e.g. XMLHttpRequest
’X-Requested-With’,
# IP addres or hostname that originated the request (after travelling
# through a proxy)
’X-Forwarded-For’,
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# The original protocol used when the request was made, e.g. "https" (after
# travelling through a proxy
’X-Forwarded-Proto’,
# Used by a proxy server to include information that would otherwise be
# lost at lower levels in the protocol stack
’Forwarded’,
# The email address of the user making the request, most often used by
# robots as contact information for the robot administrator
’From’,
# Settings for protocol-upgrade with an HTTP/2 capable host
’HTTP2-Settings’,
# Another protocol, to which the agent wishes to switch, e.g. HTTP/2.0
’Upgrade’,
# Credentials request by a proxy in the request chain. Consumed by the
# first proxy requesting authentication.
’Proxy-Authorization’,
# List of conditions for a resource to meet for a response to be requested
’If’,
# An entity tag that must match the resource for a response to be requested
’If-Match’,
# Combination of If-Match and If-Unmodified-Since for a range request
’If-Range’,
# A timestamp. A response is requested if the entity has not been modified
# since this time.
’If-Unmodified-Since’,
# An integer. Used with TRACE or OPTIONS requests to limit forwarding by
# proxies
’Max-Forwards’,
# Preferences requested of the server, examples include: asynchronous
# response, relative priority, response verbosity
’Prefer’,
# A list of proxies through which the request was sent
’Via’,
# Protocol stack that that the client would like to tunnel via HTTP
’ALPN’,
# Expected response from the server, usually HTTP 100 (Continue). In this
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# case the client wishes to know if a request body is acceptable before
# sending it to the server.
’Expect’,
# Alternative host that the client selected for a request
’Alt-Used’,
# Client indicating whether or not it would like timezones on calendars
’CalDAV-Timezones’,
# A boolean, indicates if a client will attend a CalDAV calendar event
’Schedule-Reply’,
# A CalDAV opaque token for a calendar schedule. A response is requested
# if the resource matches the schedule
’If-Schedule-Tag-Match’,
# COPY or MOVE request destination for a WebDAV request
’Destination’,
# A URL to a lock. Used with the UNLOCK method to remove the lock.
’Lock-Token’,
# Number of seconds for which a WebDAV LOCK should be active
’Timeout’,
# A WebDAV URI, indicates the request order of the requested collection.
’Ordering-Type’,
# A boolean indicating if a WebDAV resource should be overwritten due to
# the request
’Overwrite’,
# A string indicating the desired position at which to insert a resource in
# a WebDAV request
’Position’,
# Tree or graph depth of the resource on which the request should act.
# (used by WebDAV)
’Depth’,
# Arbitrary text, when present with a POST request, indicates to the server
# a desired description for the content to be used in URIs
’SLUG’,
# Set of header fields that will be included with the trailer of a
# message sent using a chunked transfer encoding
’Trailer’,
# The Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions version used when constructing




# Create a dictionary of masks for the headers which can be authenticated.
# Shift them by thier (index + 1) to leave room for the nonce-based-replay
# prevention indicator.




















































def header_to_dict(header, outer_sep=’;’, inner_sep=’:’):
’’’










# remove empty tokens
kvs = (kv for kv in kvs if kv != ’’)
# split key/value tokens
kvs = (kv.split(inner_sep) for kv in kvs)
# parse key/value tokens
d = {kv[0]: base64.b64decode(kv[1]) for kv in kvs if len(kv) == 2}
return d
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def tuples_to_header(tuples, outer_sep=’;’, inner_sep=’:’):
"""
Takes a list of (k, v) string tuples and returns a string
for the Session Armor header value
"""
encoded_tuples = [(tup[0], base64.b64encode(tup[1])) for tup in tuples]
return outer_sep.join([inner_sep.join(tup) for tup in encoded_tuples])
def validate_ready_header(header):
’’’
validate that there is only one header key and it is ’r’
’’’
return len(header) == 1 and header.keys()[0] == ’r’
def validate_signed_request(header):

















pack an integer as a byte string with this format
bit length of mask cannot exceed 256
<num_bytes> <little-endian bytestring>
byte0 byte1, byte2 ...
’’’
data = int_to_bytes(mask)





unpack a byte string as an integer with this format
<num_bytes> <little-endian bytestring>






return mask & 0x01
def int_to_bytes(i):
’’’
convert an integer to a litte-endian byte string
’’’
















for i, _ in enumerate(bstr):




Given a bit vector indicating supported hash algorithms, return a Python
hash module for the strongest digest algorithm
’’’
hash_mask = unpack_mask(packed_hash_mask)
for bitmask in HASH_ALGO_MASKS:




’HMAC algorithm bitmask did not match any hash implementations.’)
def select_hash_mask(packed_hash_mask):
’’’
Given a header dictionary, select a hash function supported by the client.
Return a bitmask denoting the selected module.
1. Decode base64 value of ready header
2. Parse into bit vector
3. Select a hash algorithm supported by the client using the bit vector
4. Return the bitmask for the selected hash module
’’’
# base64 decode the value of the ready key into a byte string
hash_mask = unpack_mask(packed_hash_mask)
# store the bit vector as an integer
for bitmask in HASH_ALGO_MASKS:
if bitmask[0] & hash_mask:
return pack_mask(bitmask[0])
raise HmacInvalid(
’Client ready header bitmask did not match any hash algorithms.’)
def is_modifying_session(response):
"""
Is this response creating a new session?
"""
sessionid = response.cookies.get(settings.SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, None)
sessionid = getattr(sessionid, ’value’, None)
return bool(sessionid is not None)
def extract_session_id(response):
"""















Generate a new key for use by the client and server to sign requests
"""
return os.urandom(16)
def encrypt_opaque(sessionid, hmac_key, expiration_time,
hash_mask, auth_headers, extra_auth_headers):
aesgcm = AESGCM(SECRET_KEY)
# start the nonce off with the current epoch time
nonce = struct.pack(’>I’, int(time.time()))
# add 8 random bytes for a total of 128 bits
nonce += os.urandom(8)
plaintext = ’|’.join((sessionid, hmac_key, expiration_time))
auth_data = ’|’.join((hash_mask, auth_headers, extra_auth_headers))
ciphertext = aesgcm.encrypt(nonce, plaintext, auth_data)
ciphertext, tag = ciphertext[:-16], ciphertext[-16:]
return ciphertext, nonce, tag
def decrypt_opaque(opaque, nonce, tag,
hash_mask, auth_headers, extra_auth_headers):
aesgcm = AESGCM(SECRET_KEY)
auth_data = ’|’.join((hash_mask, auth_headers, extra_auth_headers))
try:
plaintext = aesgcm.decrypt(nonce, opaque + tag, auth_data)
except InvalidTag:
raise OpaqueInvalid(
"Opaque token from the client failed to authenticate")
try:
sessionid, remainder = plaintext.split(’|’, 1)
hmac_key, expiration_time = (remainder[:16], remainder[17:])
except ValueError:
raise OpaqueInvalid(
"Plaintext from opaque token didn’t have required fields")
return sessionid, hmac_key, int(expiration_time)
def begin_session(header, sessionid, packed_header_mask):
’’’
Input: client Session Armor headers when in a valid ready state
Output: server Session Armor headers for a new session
Side Effects: A nonce-based replay vector persisted externally
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’’’
# Create opaque token




eah = get_setting(’S_ARMOR_EXTRA_AUTHENTICATED_HEADERS’, [])
if eah:
eah = ’,’.join(eah)

























def auth_header_values(request, header_mask, extra_headers):
’’’
Returns array of header values in order based on request bitmask




headers = headers + extra_headers
values = []
for header in headers:
if header == ’Host’:
values.append(request.get_host())
continue





def server_hmac(algo_mask, key, string):
digestmod = select_hash_module(algo_mask)






latest_nonce, reciept_vector = nonce_tup
else:
latest_nonce, reciept_vector = (request_nonce,
INITIAL_RECIEPT_VECTOR)
delta = latest_nonce - request_nonce
if delta < 0:
# This a "future" nonce
latest_nonce = request_nonce
# Shift our current vector to the left
reciept_vector <<= -delta
# And set that this new nonce has been seen
reciept_vector |= 0x01
elif delta >= 0 and delta < RECIEPT_VECTOR_BITS:
# This is a "past" nonce that we have the ability to check
if reciept_vector & (1 << delta):
message = "Request nonce has been seen before"
raise NonceInvalid(message)
else:
# Set the bit in the bit vector
reciept_vector |= 1 << delta
elif delta > 0 and delta >= RECIEPT_VECTOR_BITS:
# This is "past" nonce that we don’t have the ability to check
message = "Nonce is too old to validate"
raise NonceInvalid(message)
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# Clamp to RECIEPT_VECTOR_BITS because otherwise Python will gladly shift
# our vector into a bigint
reciept_vector &= RECIEPT_VECTOR_MASK




extra_headers = request_header.get(’eah’, None)
sessionid, hmac_key, expiration_time = decrypt_opaque(
request_header[’s’], request_header[’iv’], request_header[’tag’],
hash_mask, auth_headers, extra_headers)
# Session expiration check
if expiration_time <= int(time.time()):
raise SessionExpired(’Session expired due to absolute expiration time’)
# HMAC validation
# Performs time-based and nonce-based replay prevention if present
# Rebuild HMAC input
using_nonce = using_nonce_replay_prevention(request_header[’ah’])
hmac_input = [request_header[’n’], ’+’] if using_nonce else [’+’]
hmac_input.append(request_header[’t’])
hmac_input.append(request_header[’lt’])
extra_headers = extra_headers.split(’,’) if extra_headers else []




# unicode objects to bytestring for ordinals greater than 128
hmac_input = [x.decode(’latin1’).encode(’latin1’) for x in hmac_input]
hmac_input = ’|’.join(hmac_input)
# Perform HMAC validation
our_mac = server_hmac(request_header[’h’], hmac_key, hmac_input)
hmac_valid = hmac.compare_digest(our_mac, request_header[’c’])
if not hmac_valid:
raise HmacInvalid()
# If the request is valid, but too much time has elapsed since the prior
# request, expire the session. Note that it’s fine to do this before replay
# prevetion, because even if an attacker were trying to maliciously replay
# the request, the authenticated request embeds information that will
# always expire the session, namely, the request time and the prior request




if (int(request_header[’t’]) - int(request_header[’lt’]) >=
inactivity_timeout_seconds):
raise SessionExpired(’Session expired due to inactivity’)
# Validate that the request has not expired (time-based replay prevention)
# NB: This is done after HMAC validation
request_duration_seconds = get_setting(
’S_ARMOR_REQUEST_VALID_SECONDS’, SECONDS_5_MINUTES)
if time.time() - int(request_header[’t’]) >= request_duration_seconds:
raise RequestExpired()







extra_headers = request_header.get(’eah’, None)
_, hmac_key, _ = decrypt_opaque(
request_header[’s’], request_header[’iv’], request_header[’tag’],
hash_mask, auth_headers, extra_headers)




Implementation of the Session Armor protocol.
Session Armor is an HTTP session authentication protocol hardened against
request replay and request forgery.
’’’
def __init__(self):









Process states of the Session Armor protocol for incoming requests
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’’’
header_str = request.META.get(’HTTP_X_S_ARMOR’, None)
if not self.strict and not header_str:
return
elif self.strict and not header_str:
# Disallow requests from clients that do not support SessionArmor
# If another middleware’s process_request raises an Exception
# before this one, then the following PermissionDenied exception
# will not be raised. This would be a breach of the authentication
# system if this pre-empting exception is handled, and a cookie or
# other authentication credential is used to allow a privileged
# action. Any of the exception handlers called in the lifecycle of
# Django’s BaseHandler could allow this to happen, including the
# handle_exception of another middleware.
#
# NB: This applies to all PermissionDenied exceptions called from
# the context of this middleware.




if state == CLIENT_READY and request.is_secure():
try:
select_hash_mask(request_header[’r’])
except HmacInvalid as e:
# Client provided an invalid HMAC algo mask
LOGGER.debug(str(e))
# Need to raise PermissionDenied here rather than in
# process_response, otherwise the client will get a 500 rather
# than a 403.
raise PermissionDenied(str(e))
elif state == CLIENT_SIGNED_REQUEST:
try:
sa_sessionid = validate_request(request, request_header)
except SessionExpired as e:
LOGGER.debug(str(e))
# Return before injeting the session cookie. The request will
# be processed without a user object. This allows session
# invalidation to proceed in process_response. We add a header




except OpaqueInvalid as e:




except HmacInvalid as e:
# Client’s HMAC did not validate
LOGGER.debug(str(e))
raise PermissionDenied(str(e))
except RequestExpired as e:
# Time-based replay prevention
LOGGER.debug(str(e))
raise PermissionDenied(str(e))
except NonceInvalid as e:





def process_response(self, request, response):
’’’
Process states of the Session Armor protocol for outgoing requests
’’’













# If the algo mask was invalid then PermissionDenied was raised
# in ProcessRequest
return response
elif state == CLIENT_SIGNED_REQUEST:
# Session invalidation
# Check if the session has expired
if request.META.get(’HTTP_X_S_ARMOR_INVALIDATE’, None):
response[’X-S-Armor’] = invalidate_session(request_header)
# Check if the server is deleting the session, e.g. a logout
# view has executed.




A.2 Client Reference Implementation, Chrome Extension Source Code
"use strict";
/*
Session Armor Protocol, Google Chrome Extension
Copyright (C) 2016 Andrew Sauber
This software is licensed under the AGPLv3 open source license. See
LICENSE.txt. The license can also be found at the following URL, please note
the above copyright notice. https://www.gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.en.html
*/
var _ = require("underscore");
var Hashes = require("jshashes");
var compare = require("secure-compare");
require("./status-icon");
/* request related */
var hashAlgoMask = "\x01\x05";
var hashModules = [
[1 << 0, new Hashes.SHA256({’utf8’: false})],
// [1 << 1, Hashes.SHA384],
[1 << 2, new Hashes.SHA512({’utf8’: false})],
[1 << 3, new Hashes.RMD160({’utf8’: false})]
]
hashModules = _.object(hashModules);
var bodyCache = {}
var headerChoices = [



























































// capture everything up to the first lone slash
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// capture everything up to the first lone slash




// capture everything after the first lone slash
var path = url.match(/(.+:\/\/[ˆ/]+)\/(.*|$)/)[2];
return ’/’ + path;
}
function domainHasSession(url) {






var bytes = [], charCode;
for (var i = 0, len = str.length; i < len; ++i) {
charCode = str.charCodeAt(i);
if ((charCode & 0xFF00) >> 8) {







var n = 0;
for (var i = bytes.length - 1, len = bytes.length; i >= 0; --i) {





// Not using an arbitrary precision implementation of this for two reasons:
// 1. Bitwise operators in JavaScript convert operands to 32-bit signed
// integers, unlike Python, which maintains arbitrary precision.
// 2. If the input has its MSB as 1, it’s treated as negative number, and
// gets 1-filled on the right when shifted, resulting in "negative" byte
// values which are not amenable to string encoding.
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// Thus, this 0x00ff mask, which is used to kill the 1-filled bits of
// parameters which happen to be negative when coerced.
return [
(i >> 24 & 0x00ff),
(i >> 16 & 0x00ff),
(i >> 8 & 0x00ff),







return _.map(_.keys(obj), function (key) {













if (!str) return {};
var pairs = str.split(’;’);








function hmac(key, hashMask, string) {
var macObj = hashModules[hashMask];
return macObj.b64_hmac(key, string);
}
function headerValuesToAuth(headerMask, extraHeaders, requestHeaders) {
var selectedHeaders = [];
for (var i = 0, len = headerMask.length; i < len; ++i) {
var currentByte = headerMask[len - 1 - i];
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for (var j = 0; j < 8; ++j) {
if (currentByte & (1 << j)) {




// Append the extra authenticated headers in their order
selectedHeaders = selectedHeaders.concat(extraHeaders);
// These need to be appended in the bitmask order
var authHeaderValues = [];
for (var header of selectedHeaders) {
for (var reqHeader of requestHeaders) {







function stringForAuth(nonce, requestTime, lastRequestTime, authHeaderValues,
path, body) {
var macTokens = [’+’, requestTime, lastRequestTime];








function genHeaderString(originValues, ourMac, requestTime, lastRequestTime,
nonce) {



















var originValues = JSON.parse(localStorage[getOrigin(details.url)]);
var hmacKey = originValues[’kh’];
if (usingNonceReplayPrevention(originValues.ah)) {
var nonce = getNonce(details.url);
}
nonce = nonce ? setAndIncrementNonce(details.url, nonce) : null;
var requestTime = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
var lastRequestTime = localStorage[getOrigin(details.url) + ’|lrt’];
var path = getPath(details.url);
var body = bodyCache[details.requestId];
/* we use two seperate callbacks, so don’t leak memory*/
delete bodyCache[details.requestId];
var authHeaderValues = headerValuesToAuth(originValues.headerMask,
originValues.eah.split(’,’),
details.requestHeaders);
var authString = stringForAuth(nonce, requestTime, lastRequestTime,
authHeaderValues, path, body);
var ourMac = hmac(hmacKey, originValues.hashMask, authString);
ourMac = atob(ourMac);










var charCode = headerMask.charCodeAt(headerMask.length - 1);
return !!(charCode & 0x01);
}
function getNonce(url) {
var origin = getOrigin(url);






function setNonce(url, nonce) {
var origin = getOrigin(url);
nonce = bytesToString(intToBytes(nonce));
localStorage[origin + ’|nonce’] = nonce;
return nonce;
}




function storeNewSession(url, headerValues) {
var origin = getOrigin(url);
if (!origin.startsWith("https")) {








function invalidateSession(url, serverMac) {
var origin = getOrigin(url);
var originValues = JSON.parse(localStorage[origin]);
var hmacKey = originValues[’kh’];
var ourMac = hmac(hmacKey, originValues.hashMask, "Session Expired");
serverMac = btoa(serverMac);






var headerValues = {};
_.each(details.responseHeaders, function(header) {























// Set "last request time" for this domain to now
var lastRequestTimeKey = getOrigin(details.url) + ’|lrt’;





return encodeURIComponent(s).replace(/[()’!]/g, function(c) {




return _.map(Object.keys(formData), function(key) {
// each key has an array of values
return _.map(formData[key], function(value) {
return key + ’=’ +
extendedEncodeURIComponent(value).replace(/%20/g, ’+’);
}).join(’&’);
// forms are encoded with key=value pairs joined with ’&’




/* Skip this step if this request does not have a related, active,
* SessionArmor session, or does not have body data */
if (!domainHasSession(details.url) || !details.requestBody) return;
if (details.requestBody.error) {
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/* If Chrome has a problem parsing the request body,
* log and continue. The request will fail on the server side. */
console.log("request body error: " + details.requestBody.error);
} else if (details.requestBody.raw) {
/*
Raw body authentication requires patching Chromium as follows. This
forces Chrome to use the "raw" presenter for both the MIME type of












































Table B.1: Domain Susceptibility to Session Hijacking
Domain Bearer Tokens Packet Sniõng Cross-Site Scripting Alexa Rank
drive.google.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 1
mail.google.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 1
facebook.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 2
youtube.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 3
yahoo.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 5
amazon.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 6
console.aws.amazon.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 6
en.wikipedia.org Vulnerable Protected Protected 7
twitter.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 9
linkedin.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 14
ebay.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 17
yandex.ru Vulnerable Protected Protected 19
instagram.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 28
reddit.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 31
wordpress.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 40
paypal.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 42
account.microso.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 43
apple.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 49
netix.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 53
stackoverow.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 56
alibaba.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 63
github.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 91
dropbox.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 98
chase.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 119
twitch.tv Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 139
soundcloud.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 166
snapdeal.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 171
steampowered.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 231
sourceforge.net Vulnerable Protected Protected 267
accounts.spotify.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 346
kickstarter.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 368
newegg.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 374
evernote.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 386
oracle.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 425
meetup.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 433
slack.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 540
intuit.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 547
ibm.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 774
atlassian.net Vulnerable Protected Protected 821
macrumors.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 1091
bitbucket.org Vulnerable Protected Protected 1106
mint.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 1198
kongregate.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 1434
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bandcamp.com Vulnerable Protected Vulnerable 1444
humblebundle.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 1630
cloud.digitalocean.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 1713
membership.square-enix.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 2004
news.ycombinator.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 2057
tdbank.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 2141
minecra.net Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 2449
teespring.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 2478
amtrak.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 3070
dramafever.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 3324
pcpartpicker.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 3743
airdroid.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 4849
linuxquestions.org Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 4979
express.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 5289
microcenter.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 5749
bitcointalk.org Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 6040
coinbase.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 6167
archlinux.org Vulnerable Protected Protected 6572
gumroad.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 7417
hackerrank.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 8264
zennioptical.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 8643
xmarks.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 8900
hitbox.tv Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 9090
unrealengine.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 9718
oculus.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 10462
wallhaven.cc Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 12278
codechef.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 13112
caremark.com Vulnerable Protected Vulnerable 13202
venmo.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 14225
expensify.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 14249
freesound.org Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 14353
login.aessuccess.org Vulnerable Protected Protected 14877
wellsfargodealerservices.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 15948
loseit.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 16215
bluejeans.com Vulnerable Protected Vulnerable 18845
coastal.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 21508
topcoder.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 21551
codeforces.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 22019
thebodyshop-usa.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 24844
bayan.ir Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 27057
kanbanow.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 30466
teavana.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 33993
projecteuler.net Vulnerable Protected Protected 35078
bighugelabs.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 38333
afraid.org Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 39307
myminifactory.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 39358
dcollege.net Vulnerable Protected Protected 42970
kraken.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 43088
bitcoin.cz Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 48778
typeracer.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 50197
tdcardservices.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 56458
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audiotool.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 72253
hashicorp.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 72667
fourmilab.ch Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 75080
ocremix.org Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 82602
unrealtournament.com Vulnerable Protected Protected 105627
quakelive.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 150405
qhimm.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 218679
lexaloøe.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 226464
contactlensking.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 236765
usaco.org Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 256864
zergid.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 285250
wvshare.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 294061
catzilla.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Protected 387793
amarriner.com Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 3489038
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Appendix C. Formal Veriûcation
C.1 ProverifModel
(* Copyright 2016 - present Andrew Sauber. All rights reserved. *)
(* Formal verification of the Session Armor protocol using pi-calculus *)
(******************************************************************************)
(* Q: If the server completes the protocol, and the the client began the
protocol exactly once, what does that prove? *)
(* A: It proves that an attacker acting as a server could not have fulfilled
the request from the client and then acted as a man-in-the-middle to
impersonate the client and replay the request with the legitimate server.
In other words, a legitimate request can only be completed once. *)
(* Q: What do we want to prove? *)
(* A: We want to prove that if the client makes a request using an hmac with a
certain key, then only the client that originally received the key during the
setup phase of the SA the protocol could have made this request. We also want to
prove that an attacker cannot access the server_secret or any client_secret *)
(* Q: Can we prove that the request was made within a specified time period? *)
(* A: ProVerif does not have a notion of time, so we cannot prove that the
request was made within a specified time period. However, there was a paper
published by one of the ProVerif authors indicating that a nonce can be used to








free HTTPS: channel [private].
free HTTP: channel.
(* Free Variables *)




fun encrypt(bitstring, key): bitstring.
reduc forall plaintext: bitstring, k: key;
decrypt(encrypt(plaintext, k), k) = plaintext.
fun hmac(bitstring, key): bitstring.
(* Correspondence events *)
event clientRequest(key, timestamp, nonce, bitstring, bitstring).
event serverResponse(key, timestamp, nonce, bitstring, bitstring).
















(* Secrecy queries *)
query attacker(server_secret_test).
query attacker(session_secret_test).


























(* Server Macros *)
let webapp() =


















let (=session_id, =user_id, =session_secret, =session_expiry) =
decrypt(client_token, server_secret) in
let (server_hmac: bitstring) =
hmac((request_time, request_nonce, request_url, request_data),
session_secret) in








( !(browser()) | !(webapp()) )
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{22}in(HTTP, (request_time_37: timestamp,request_nonce_38: nonce,
request_hmac: bitstring,client_token: bitstring,
request_url_39: bitstring,request_data_40: bitstring));
{23}let (=session_id_34, =user_id_31, =session_secret_33,
=session_expiry_35) =
decrypt(client_token,server_secret) in
{24}let server_hmac: bitstring = hmac((request_time_37,request_nonce_38,
request_url_39,request_data_40),session_secret_33) in




-- Query not attacker(session_secret_test[])
Completing...
Starting query not attacker(session_secret_test[])
RESULT not attacker(session_secret_test[]) is true.
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-- Query not attacker(server_secret_test[])
Completing...
Starting query not attacker(server_secret_test[])

















goal reachable: begin(clientRequest(session_secret_33[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],request_time[session_token
= encrypt((session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],user_id[],session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426]),server_secret[]),session_expiry = session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_secret =
session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],session_id = session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],!1 = @sid_2427],request_nonce[session_token =
encrypt((session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],user_id[],session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426]),server_secret[]),session_expiry = session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_secret =
session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],session_id = session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],!1 = @sid_2427],request_url[session_token =
encrypt((session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],user_id[],session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426]),server_secret[]),session_expiry = session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_secret =
session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
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endsid_2426],session_id = session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],!1 = @sid_2427],request_data[session_token =
encrypt((session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],user_id[],session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426]),server_secret[]),session_expiry = session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_secret =
session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],session_id = session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],!1 = @sid_2427]), session_token =
encrypt((session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],user_id[],session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426]),server_secret[]),
session_expiry = session_expiry_35[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426], session_secret = session_secret_33[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426], session_id =
session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426], @sid = @sid_2427, @occ11 = @occ_cst) ->
end(endsid_2426,serverResponse(session_secret_33[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],request_time[session_token
= encrypt((session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],user_id[],session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426]),server_secret[]),session_expiry = session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_secret =
session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],session_id = session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],!1 = @sid_2427],request_nonce[session_token =
encrypt((session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],user_id[],session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426]),server_secret[]),session_expiry = session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_secret =
session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],session_id = session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],!1 = @sid_2427],request_url[session_token =
encrypt((session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],user_id[],session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426]),server_secret[]),session_expiry = session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_secret =
session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],session_id = session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],!1 = @sid_2427],request_data[session_token =
encrypt((session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],user_id[],session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
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user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426]),server_secret[]),session_expiry = session_expiry_35[password_32 =
password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 = endsid_2426],session_secret =
session_secret_33[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 = user_id[],!1 =
endsid_2426],session_id = session_id_34[password_32 = password[],user_id_31 =
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